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“What in us really wills the truth? We asked about the value of this will. Granted, 
we will truth: why not untruth instead? And uncertainty? Even ignorance?”  
Friedrich Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil1  
 
 
What is philosophy? What does it mean when an individual is described as a philosopher? The 
imputation of a vague loftiness of purpose has been characteristic of the layman’s attitude 
towards the discipline. Within the discipline itself, attempts towards self-clarification are 
conducted under the aegis of further philosophical analysis. The value of philosophy itself – as 
well as that of its preferred means of analysis – is left unremarked upon and taken for granted.  
Friedrich Nietzsche took it upon himself to conduct this missing fundamental 
interrogation, and in so doing, assigned himself a unique vantage point. He insisted that his 
work was indeed philosophy, but simultaneously reserved a place for himself outside of 
‘traditional’ philosophy. His rationale for this self-positioning was the sense that the true task 
of philosophy must be the clarification of values, including the value of philosophy itself. I 
believe the quote that serves as the epigraph for this introduction illustrates the distinctive line 
of attack of the Nietzschean critique.  
Nietzsche’s critique of philosophy tends to be indistinguishable from a parallel critique 
of the philosopher as a human type. If the critique of philosophy is to be a clarification of the 
values that inhere within the discipline and inform it, the philosopher too must be similarly 
interrogated as to the values that constitute him, insomuch as ‘philosophy is an involuntary 
memoir’.2 I submit that a broad critique of philosophy can be extricated from this critique of 
the philosopher as a human type, while being inclusive of it in acknowledgment of Nietzsche’s 
commingling of the two.  
This broad critique of philosophy is an interrogation of philosophy’s traditional and 
foundational assumptions. These assumptions include, firstly, the conceptualization of the 
world as fundamentally regular and objective, and therefore amenable to philosophical 
speculation of the traditional variety. This Nietzschean critique of the pretensions of objectivity 
– including that of philosophical description, insomuch as it aspires to objectivity – is a 
leitmotif that recurs throughout his corpus. An offshoot of this broad critique is one that 
challenges philosophy’s historical privilege as a mode of value legislation, its status as the 
resource par excellence for the determination of the meaning of life – especially when 
contrasted to art. 
The second assumption which falls under the Nietzschean critique is the value of truth 
and certainty. Nietzsche observes that, despite the various metaphysical claims and systems of 
thought propounded by individuals of different ages and origins, the demand for truth and 
certainty remains a constant. Philosophy’s self-interrogation therefore cannot be completed 
without a similarly fundamental interrogation of the value of truth, insomuch as this value is 
integral to philosophy’s traditional self-conception.  
 
1 Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, (1:§1), 5  
2 Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, (1:§6), 8  
 
The third aspect of Nietzsche’s critique focuses on the figure of the philosopher 
considered as a distinct human type. Nietzsche notes that a simple glance at the history of 
philosophy reveals the common figure of the philosopher. This appears a non-descript and 
essentially uncontroversial observation: philosophy tends to be performed by philosophers. 
Nietzsche’s claim, however, is much more dramatic. The commonality of the figure of the 
philosopher obscures a much more interesting commonality, that of psychological motivation. 
Nietzsche believes that this psychology of the philosopher, those ‘knowers who are unknown 
to themselves’, is a value-orientation that has gone unquestioned so far, and must therefore be 
brought to light in order to untie the knot that philosophy has found itself in.3 
My aim is to perform an interpretative reconstruction of the origin of philosophy that 
will be sourced from Nietzsche’s description of ressentiment in The Genealogy of Morality. 
The choice of text is because I believe it is here that Nietzsche’s interrogation of values reaches 
its most concrete lucidity with devastating effects on the traditional practice of philosophy. 
Ressentiment functions as the focal point in my interpretation because it plays a negative, but 
nonetheless fundamental role in value-production. My interpretation is therefore guided by the 
Nietzschean-informed hypothesis that philosophy is the culmination of this ressentiment-
driven negative value orientation.  
In this introduction, I will engage in a brief discussion of Nietzsche’s philosophical 
development, contextualized by the intellectual climate of his time, in order to delineate some 
of his most pressing themes as a thinker, as well as their conjunction with his growing suspicion 
of philosophy. I will then move on to an examination of the genealogical method that Nietzsche 
employs in this text, especially contrasting it to the rival genealogies to which his text was a 
response. After this, I will engage briefly in a discussion of naturalism and chaos, and what 
these elements mean in Nietzsche’s larger philosophical project as well as their role in the 
Genealogy of Morality. I believe that these discussions will help set the scene for the following 
chapters wherein ressentiment, its origin and function, is discussed. 
 
 
Nietzsche’s philosophical context  
Nietzsche is today considered a thinker who stands somewhat apart from his 
contemporaries – this is partly due to his undoubted originality of thought, but also to his self-
characterization as ‘untimely’, and as a ‘madman who comes too early’. This self-
characterization however belies Nietzsche’s lifelong engagement with the intellectual trends of 
his time.  
While it has become a byword of the hagiography surrounding Nietzsche that he was 
entirely ignored during his active career, this is not true. While certainly not showered with 
attention, the few remarks that concerned him as a thinker classified him as one amongst the 
numerous Schopenhauer-influenced amateur philosophers that dotted Germany at the time.4  
Nietzsche trained as a philologist and therefore had very little conventional 
philosophical education. Nonetheless, as a philologist of Ancient Greek, Ancient Greek 
philosophy was a field with which he was intimately familiar. With this caveat, his subsequent 
philosophical activity was very much a product of auto-didacticism. The first major 
philosophical influence on Nietzsche was the American Transcendentalist, Ralph Waldo 
Emerson, whose influence on Nietzsche was instrumental in severing the last links that tied the 
 
3 Nietzsche, The Genealogy of Morals, (Preface:§1), 3  
4 Brobjer, Nietzsche’s Philosophical Context, 2 
 
latter to his boyhood Christianity. While Emerson is rarely mentioned by name in his writings, 
Nietzsche held him in high regard. Emerson coloured Nietzsche’s thinking with regard to 
religion, morality, and the existence and necessity of the ‘higher man’ and his tasks.5 The 
second major thinker with whom Nietzsche engaged in a dialogue throughout his career was 
Plato. Nietzsche retained a mixed opinion of Plato. On the one hand, Nietzsche despised the 
latter’s philosophy with a surprising personal venom. He accused the Socratic dialectic of 
breaking the unity of the Apollonian and Dionysian elements of Greek culture – a unity 
represented by the Greek tragedy; see Nietzsche’s attack on Euripides. The downfall of Greek 
tragedy was only the epiphenomenon of the subterranean turn from aesthetic affirmation to 
proto-nihilistic philosophy and it was Nietzsche’s conviction that this turn was entirely due to 
Socrates/Plato.6 However, he maintained an admiration for Plato’s character, stating that ‘he 
was far too noble for his philosophy’. Nonetheless, Nietzsche held that his own philosophy was 
the mirror image of Platonism viz. the abandonment of the search of any ‘true being’, and the 
return to a philosophy of appearance.7 
The third, and perhaps most fundamental influence on Nietzsche’s development as a 
thinker – insomuch as it motivated him to engage seriously with philosophical questions – was 
Schopenhauer. Schopenhauer’s philosophy, expressed in his magnum opus, The World as Will 
and Representation, regarded life as a place of inescapable suffering; and the ‘dark colour’ of 
his profound pessimism would imbue Nietzsche’s thinking. As George Santayana wrote, 
Nietzsche’s entire career was an ‘emendation of Schopenhauer’.8 This might be uncharitable 
towards Nietzsche, and this opinion will not detain me here – nonetheless, it is a measure of 
how fundamental Schopenhauer’s influence was. Nietzsche’s insistence on the affirmation of 
life despite its tragic nature – the thought experiment of eternal recurrence, the rallying cry of 
amor fati – derives its force from the Schopenhauerian insistence on the lack of an intelligible 
and benevolent deity. Schopenhauerian pessimism is transformed in Nietzsche into tragic 
optimism.  The engagement with Schopenhauer also ensured that Nietzsche was brought up to 
speed with the history of philosophy – The World as Will and Representation is in large part a 
dialogue with earlier thinkers. While Nietzsche respected Schopenhauer as an independent 
thinker, he made a decisive break with him in 1875-76. A suspicion of all metaphysics, and a 
repudiation of the value of pity and suffering – in other words, a rejection of the two leitmotifs 
of Schopenhauerian thought – would characterize Nietzsche’s work from this point.  
Another important influence on Nietzsche during this time was the discovery of Albert 
Lange’s magisterial history of philosophical materialism. Lange’s book not only deepened 
Nietzsche’s knowledge of the history of philosophy, but also provided the impetus for his 
engagement with several thinkers mentioned in the book – Democritus and Kant, for example. 
Nietzsche’s subsequent engagement with Kant provided another intellectual foundation for his 
philosophical career, as Kant represented the background and starting point for all German 
philosophy during this time, including the work of Schopenhauer and Lange.9 
 The final decisive influence on Nietzsche’s thinking came from his friend, Paul Ree. 
Ree had written several books investigating the origin of moral sentiments using a method that 
combined naturalism, empiricism, and evolutionism. His work was instrumental in moving 
Nietzsche’s interests towards the natural sciences and anthropology, and away from his own 
 
5 Ibid., 24 
6 Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy, §20, 547 Brobjer, Nietzsche’s Philosophical Context, 27 
7 Brobjer, Nietzsche’s Philosophical Context, 27 
7 Brobjer, Nietzsche’s Philosophical Context, 27 
8 Santayana, Egotism in German Philosophy, 114 
9 Brobjer, Nietzsche’s Philosophical Context, 3410 Geuss, “Nietzsche and Genealogy”, 275 
Schopenhauer-derived aesthetically flavoured pessimism. Ree was also important in provoking 
Nietzsche’s vehement disagreement, not with the strategy of the former’s investigation, but 
with its depth and direction. The Genealogy of Morality is in large part a riposte to Ree’s work.  
 
On Nietzsche’s genealogy  
Nietzsche’s bombastic critique of philosophy originates from a perspective outside that 
of philosophy. This attempt to deconstruct philosophy from without – Nietzsche’s 
‘metaphilosophy’, to apply anachronistically a later term – required a different approach, one 
which he found in the genealogical method. My aim in this section is therefore to expand 
slightly on what Nietzsche is doing when he says he is performing a genealogical critique.  
The ordinary signification of the word genealogy is finding or establishing a pedigree. 
To a certain extent, this task of ‘establishing a pedigree’ has a superficial overlap with 
Nietzsche’s genealogical method. Geuss, however, problematizes this signification to ensure 
that it is not confused with Nietzsche’s understanding of the term; he insists that Nietzsche’s 
genealogy has nothing to do with establishing a pedigree, if by this is meant, the objective of 
‘positive valorisation’ of some contemporary item, person or institution.10 I believe this is an 
accurate interpretation because I consider Nietzsche’s philosophical project to be profoundly 
destabilizing in its approach and intent; I do not believe Nietzsche viewed his genealogy as a 
simple historical recounting.  
On Geuss’s account, the ordinary concept of genealogy – of a singular and 
uninterrupted line of descent from a similarly singular origin, which contains and bestows an 
uncorrupted value upon the contemporary recipient – has nothing in common with Nietzsche’s 
genealogy.11 As Geuss notes, the objective of Nietzsche’s genealogy is generally not the 
construction of a straightforward history performed so as to enhance the prestige of any 
contemporary entity. Nietzsche’s ambition for his genealogical method is more radical than 
this, and therefore more disruptive.  
Nietzsche also disavows the simplistic notion that our contemporary concepts and 
valuations have a singular point of origin that has descended in a straight line down to our 
receiving hands – origin is never singular, but multiple. This abandonment of the search for the 
singular and the pristine is found in other areasof Nietzsche’s thinking: it forms a part of his 
perspectivism and his general emphasis on the processes of becoming over being. It is precisely 
because becoming takes precedence over being that there cannot be one single origin; 
everything is multi-determined and coheres together transitorily from multiple, sometimes 
contradictory lines of development.12  
Assuming that Geuss’ interpretation of Nietzsche’s methodology is valid, what would 
this self-consciously more rigorous application of the genealogical principle look like? Geuss 
himself points to Nietzsche’s interrogation of Christianity. Nietzschean genealogy revolves 
around the destruction of the illusion of a singular point of origin, but also the illusion of the 
coincidence of origin and interpretation.13 In other words, not only is the origin of a 
phenomenon hopelessly multidetermined, but the meaning of a phenomenon differs through 
time and can even become its’ opposite. For Nietzsche, the coincidence of origin and 
interpretation is an assumption born from naivete – and he draws attention to this naivete 
 
10 Geuss, “Nietzsche and Genealogy”, 275 
11 Ibid., 275 
12 Ibid., 276 
13 Ibid., 276 
14 Nietzsche, The Antichrist, §42,  38  
through the distinction between Jesus and Paul. The life of Jesus is the original phenomenon 
of Christianity; Paul clumsily tacks on an interpretation of the life of Jesus that mutates and 
coheres into the Christian church, until the meaning of the Church and the meaning of Christ 
are forcibly cohered and taken to be one and the same. The Church establishes the supremacy 
of its interpretation of the original phenomenon of Christ.14  
A Christian account of Christianity would therefore begin with the life of Jesus and end 
with the Christian church. But this history is a dishonest construction – either wilful, or 
unconscious – that ignores the vicissitudes and conflicting interpretations struggling over 
control of an original phenomenon. The antidote to this anaesthetizing and comforting history 
is genealogy – ‘history practiced correctly’.15  
Genealogy is thus a method of analysis that is profoundly destabilizing – one that 
unravels the familiar definitions of things and exposes the limits of familiar narratives. As 
Kretsedemas puts it, ‘commonly accepted discourses are deconstructed to reveal their 
contingency’.16 Nietzsche’s genealogical method, while used as a tool in the context of the 
Genealogy, nonetheless possesses a continuity with the texture of his thought, given his interest 
in history (see his essay ‘On the Use and abuse of History for Life’) and his disdain for binary 
valuations – for genealogy, as Kretsedemas has it, ‘exposes the embarrassing connections 
between things that would rather remain separate’.17  
To perform a genealogical interrogation of morals, therefore, would mean a thorough 
uncovering of the true history behind our moral concepts. Nietzsche however notes that he is 
not the first person to perform a genealogical extraction of morals. As I mentioned in the earlier 
section on Nietzsche’s philosophical context, the Genealogy originated in large part as a riposte 
to his friend Paul Ree, who had performed his own genealogy on the history of moral feelings. 
Nietzsche’s vehement disagreement with his friend’s analysis runs parallel to his denunciation 
of the ‘English psychologists’. The term ‘English psychologists’ functions in Nietzsche as a 
dismissively broad category of thinkers and approaches. While there are instances where 
Nietzsche insists that the English, as a race, are composed of ‘crudity and peasant seriousness’18 
and are consequently incapable of philosophy, Kail notes that it is more helpful, at least in the 
context of the Genealogy, to think of the term as referring to a particular approach to questions 
of morality, sans nationality. I will therefore use the term ‘English psychologists’ to refer to 
Nietzsche’s opponents in genealogical strategy, including Ree.19   
For Nietzsche, the main problem with the English psychologists is that they claim to 
uncover the true history of moral valuations, but in reality, their histories are facile and naïve. 
To reiterate, the genealogical method in Nietzsche is intended as an antidote to suspiciously 
neat histories and lines of descent. Where the English psychologists go wrong is that, despite 
their pretensions of rigour, they fall prey to the seduction of the simple and the straightforward. 
In uncritically accepting this historical account they abandon the spirit of a true genealogical 
approach. Janaway illustrates this central difference between the two methodologies in his 
essay, and Nietzsche too hammers home the point in his preface to the Genealogy.20 
 
14 Nietzsche, The Antichrist, §42,  38  
15 Geuss, “Nietzsche and Genealogy”, 285  
16 Kretsedemas “What is Genealogy”, 2  
17 Ibid., 2 
18 Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, §252 
19 Kail, “’Genealogy’ and the Genealogy”, 216 
20 Janaway, "Nietzsche and Paul Rée on the Origins of Moral Feelings.",§2  
21 Ibid., §2 
This can be illustrated through the differing genealogical approach to the concept of 
‘good’. With Ree, the ‘good’ becomes established due to unegoistic actions – the term is Ree’s 
and can be used synonymously with selfless – gradually becoming accepted by the community 
due to the pressures of natural selection that privilege community bonding. This ‘good’ 
eventually becomes a matter of common sense and, in a more spiritualized vein, is manipulated 
in religion and philosophy. On first glance, this seems a reasonable enough interpretation. 
Janaway however makes the point that the fundamental problem Nietzsche has with this 
interpretation is the false equivalence between the good and the unegoistic.21 I agree with this 
interpretation; the deciding break with his mentor Schopenhauer was after all due to the value 
of the unegoistic – see also his deconstruction of the sole meaning of compassion, and the 
positing of it as a ‘polyphonous being’ in Daybreak22. Indeed, the Genealogy itself can be said 
to be a deconstruction of the value of selflessness. As Nietzsche vehemently declaims, the good 
and the unegoistic are taken to be identical in content and are thus spoken of as if they were 
synonyms. This speaks to a lack of rigour in the genealogy employed. In other words, what 
Ree and the others offer up is a failure of interpretation, or more accurately, a failure in boldness 
of interpretation.  
This is the crux of Nietzsche’s disagreement with rival genealogies. They position 
themselves as brave interrogators of moral concepts, but in reality, they merely offer an updated 
version of the same facile origin story for these values. They pretend to the amoral objectivity 
of the Darwinian paradigm, but somehow end up with convoluted explanations for the same 
moral prejudices that pertained prior to Darwin – for Nietzsche, this amounts to a pathetic 
attempt to ‘marry the Darwinian beast with the moral milquetoast’.23 They seem not to 
understand or perceive that a proper genealogy must uncover origins as well as the existence 
of competing interpretations struggling over the phenomenon, and which, if uncovered, would 
imperil the uncritically accepted interpretation of the phenomenon being interrogated.  
There are some disagreements in the relevant literature regarding the metaphilosophical 
significance of the genealogical method. David Hoy believes that Nietzsche’s genealogical 
method is a manner of doing philosophy that is resolutely non-metaphysical. In his view, 
Nietzsche’s usage of this method cannot but cast previously accepted ways of doing philosophy 
as fundamentally inadequate.24 He believes that Nietzsche’s genealogical method represents a 
fundamentally new step in the history of philosophy and maintains that Nietzsche’s project – 
the sustained critique of traditional morality – could only be accomplished through this method. 
Others, however, are not as convinced: Kail agrees with Geuss in holding that genealogy is 
merely ‘history practiced correctly’.25  
These debates, while interesting, and integral to the larger discussion of Nietzsche’s 
place in the history of philosophy, are nonetheless not directly relevant to my purposes here. 
In any case, Nietzsche’s genealogical method and its foundations in his radical understanding 
of naturalism will receive further discussion in the next chapter, which will hopefully shed 
some light on the link between genealogy and traditional philosophy. Nonetheless, for the time 
being, having identified the differences in the rival methods, I note that Nietzsche and the 
 
21 Ibid., §2 
22 Nietzsche, Daybreak, §133, 122 
23 Nietzsche, On The Genealogy of Morality, (1 :§7),  8  
24 Hoy, “Nietzsche, Hume and the Genealogical Method”, 20  
25 Kail, “’Genealogy’ and the Genealogy”, 214 
26 Ibid., 217 
‘English psychologists’, are united in their attempts to provide a genealogy of morality viz. a 
naturalistic account regarding the origin of moral phenomena.  
Let is now move from this discussion on Nietzsche’s method to the more concrete 
question of the target of his genealogical investigation, morality as  riven by the binary 
valuation of ‘good’ and ‘evil’ – what Brian Leiter calls ‘morality in the pejorative sense’. 
Nietzsche’s critique of ‘morality in the pejorative sense’ ranges over three tightly linked essays. 
These essays deal respectively with two fundamentally opposed strategies of moral valuation, 
master morality and slave morality; the phenomenon of ressentiment; and the ascetic ideal in 
human psychology. Nietzsche’s genealogical strategy propels him towards an aim far more 
radical than obtaining a ‘pedigree’ for supposedly self-evident moral truths. Nietzsche’s 
ambition in using the genealogical strategy is a much more fundamental dissolution of these 
supposedly self-evident identities through historically-oriented critique.  
Nietzsche’s genealogical critique is preparatory to a full revaluation of values, 
insomuch as genealogy is necessary for exposing the contingency of such moral valuations, as 




My approach in this thesis will be as follows:  
I will begin by exploring Nietzsche’s conception of chaos and his identification of the 
same with nature. My reason for so doing is that I believe it is Nietzsche’s emphasis on chaos 
that truly differentiates his genealogy from rival attempts.  
I will then delineate the two elements of Nietzsche’s binary moral dynamic, master 
morality and slave morality. In discussing these two fundamentally different modes of human 
valuation, I outline the primary arena within which ressentiment develops. 
Having laid out that dynamic, I discuss the phenomenon of ressentiment in more detail. 
After completing this discussion of ressentiment, I devote my third chapter to an integral aspect 
of Nietzsche’s critique of philosophy, the critique of the philosopher as a human type. It will 
be divided into two parts. I will first discuss the phenomenon of ‘bad conscience’ as Nietzsche 
lays it out in the Genealogy. I follow his interpretation of bad conscience as inevitably arising 
from the new necessity of civilized, urban living. I make the connection between this 
phenomenon of bad conscience and that of ressentiment insomuch as the latter prepares the 
ground for the former. My aim in this first part of the chapter is to show that the philosopher 
as a recognizable human type is born thoroughly consumed with bad conscience. 
 In the second part of the chapter, I discuss the ascetic ideal as the outgrowth of bad 
conscience. I discuss Nietzsche’s characterization of the ascetic ideal as only an apparent 
paradox – life which seeks to deny life – that is actually a self-preservative mechanism for a 
rapidly degenerating form of life. I discuss the roots of the ascetic ideal in the ascetic priest, 
and discuss the origin of the priest and the more subtle nature of his ressentiment. Having 
completed this outline, I discuss the link between the ascetic ideal and philosophy; in this 
discussion, I emphasize Nietzsche’s appreciation for the world-historic potential of the new 
discipline of philosophy, but which was then subverted by the ascetic ideal to the extent that 
philosophy – and the philosopher – became synonymous with it.  
Chapter 4 is devoted to a discussion of the link between ressentiment and the practice 
of philosophy itself. I identify some foundational assumptions of the traditional practice of 
 
26 Ibid., 217 
philosophy – namely, the conceptualization of the world as regular and susceptible therefore 
to objective measure, and the insistence on truth and certainty – and identify these as the 
outgrowth of a logic of ressentiment. I contend that the thematization of the external world as 
fundamentally regularized and amenable to human categories is an illusion, and moreover, an 
illusion that has its roots in ressentiment, insomuch as ressentiment wishes to trample the active 
energies of life. In the vein, I also identify the effort to perceive the world as fundamentally 
regular with a concomitant effort to make oneself regular to oneself. Regarding truth, I trace 
Nietzsche’s argument that the will to truth emerges from ressentiment. I provide a brief 
discussion of Nietzsche’s thinking of art, in order to highlight what a more authentic will 
towards truth would look like. 
CHAPTER 1: Master Morality and Slave Morality  
 
“It has been ‘the good’ themselves, meaning the noble, the mighty, the high-
placed and the high-minded, who saw and judged themselves and their actions as 
good, I mean first rate, in contrast to everything lowly, low-minded, common and 
plebeian.” – On the Genealogy of Morality27  
 
To determine the origins of ressentiment and its relevance to the frame of mind that belongs to 
philosophical speculation, I will first describe the arena within which ressentiment originates 
and where it originally gains relevance. This chapter is then primarily a discussion of two 
fundamentally opposed strategies of valuation, master morality and slave morality. However, 
preparatory to this discussion, I will first discuss Nietzsche’s idea of chaos and its relation to 
nature.  
 
On Chaos and Naturalism 
According to Janaway, most commentators agree that Nietzsche is considered to be a naturalist. 
In his mature philosophy, there is a rejection of transcendent metaphysics and an immaterial 
soul. There is a corresponding emphasis on the animal nature of human beings, and the 
concomitant insistence that human beings are to be ‘translated’ back into nature.28 
Nietzsche and the English psychologists are therefore in agreement about the starting 
point for any interrogation of morals, viz. that it needs to be thoroughly naturalistic as part of 
the effort to translate the human being back into nature. However, as the previous discussion 
should have made clear, the disagreement between the two parties lies in the differing emphases 
placed on unegoism. Nietzsche’s disagreement with Ree parallels the former’s disengagement 
with Schopenhauer’s philosophy; with Schopenhauer too, there was the all too easy 
conjunction of the good and the unegoistic.29 Ree is agnostic with regard to supernatural 
explanation, and ostensibly committed to naturalism as a methodology, but still inexplicably 
holds to the value of selflessness. For Nietzsche, this is Ree’s fatal flaw.  
I will here briefly discuss chaos, the role it plays in Nietzsche’s thinking, and the 
rationale for his identification of it with nature. I undertake this discussion because I believe 
that it is the emphasis on chaos that truly differentiates Nietzsche’s genealogy from rival 
 
27 Nietzsche, On The Genealogy of Morality, (1: §2), 11  
 
28 Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil §230, 123  
29 Janaway, “Naturalism and Genealogy”, §2 
methodologies. Nietzsche insists that he regards the world in its total character as ‘chaos for all 
eternity’ – and his understanding of chaos informs his genealogical technique.30 To briefly 
return to Geuss, he interprets the Nietzschean genealogical method as emphasizing the lack of 
any singular origin for any given phenomena, as well as the absence of an uninterrupted line 
of descent for the same. These characteristics contribute to the impossibility of static 
interpretation of any kind, and this is why Nietzsche’s genealogical method emerges from his 
general appreciation of chaos.31 Babich makes the point that Nietzsche’s understanding of 
chaos is dissimilar to the modern understanding of chaos as a gradual entropic loss of order – 
and is instead rooted in the ancient Greeks, for whom chaos was the nature of the world, the 
ever-changing veil that hid the most terrible reality.32 For the Greeks, chaos is simply that 
which is without antecedent (see Hesiod’s characterization in the Theogeny) but also the 
terrible reality that was masked by the ‘turmoil of appearances’.33 But Nietzsche insisted 
throughout his career that the reason the Greeks were the ‘tragic people’ par excellence lay in 
their appreciation of the fact that it was chaos that made life itself an aesthetic phenomenon – 
Babich reiterates Nietzsche’s appropriation of the Greek understanding of chaos as 
fundamentally creative, as physis, that which brings forth of itself and out of itself.34 Heidegger, 
writing a few decades after Nietzsche, imports this Greek juxtaposition of chaos/Being into his 
definition of the phenomenon, as that which ‘shows itself in itself, the manifest’.35 I interpret 
the Nietzschean reappropriation of chaos as firstly signifying the deletion of an originative 
character to the universe and inescapably along with this, the destruction of teleological 
significance to it.  
Nietzsche’s understanding of chaos is not simply nihilistic; after all, if chaos generates 
the play of appearances that both mask and manifest it, it becomes the case that it is only as an 
‘aesthetic phenomenon that life is justified at all.’36 He agrees with the Greeks that chaos 
(khora) is fundamentally creative and generative and this accounts for his identification of 
chaos with nature. In an unpublished note from the end of his career, Nietzsche makes the 
connection even more explicit. ‘Chaos sive natura’ ( ‘chaos, that is to say, nature’) becomes 
his variation on the Spinozist ‘deus sive natura’ ( ‘nature, that is to say, God’).37 This is no 
anodyne pantheism: nature is godless and chaotic, the identification, as Babich puts it, of the 
raw chaos of the world as ‘an untrammelled realm beyond the imposition of human order or 
categories.’38  
Beyond this reappropriation of the idea of primordial chaos from the Greeks, Nietzsche 
also has a perspectival argument for the identification of chaos with nature. Simply because 
nature strikes us so perfectly, ‘without stammer’, does not mean that chaos is not hiding 
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underneath.39 Confronted by routine impressions, we nonetheless make up the major part of 
our experience. We overlook, fill in the gaps, and ‘are generally accustomed to lying’.40 The 
fact that human beings are biologically compelled to impose order upon chaos does not mean 
that the temporary exile of chaos can be assumed to be a permanent feature of nature itself. 
Nietzsche consistently insists on the modesty of consciousness.  – Nature after all, 
‘threw away the key’ to accessing things.41   To conceive of nature as chaos for all eternity 
emphasizes its imperviousness to permanent suppression or ordering under human categories, 
but also its character as permanent excess and unrest.  
The role of chaos in Nietzsche’s thinking can also be gleaned from a more subtle 
reading which emphasizes the Nietzschean insistence on the inseparability of interpretation 
from human living. Grenier notes that in spite of interpretive activity being necessary and 
permanent, this does not therefore mean that there is a ‘thing’ beneath the interpretation.42 It is 
not the case that interpretive activity is a mere series of masks that covers up a singular truth. 
The Nietzschean conception of chaos is simply the repudiation of any being-in-itself, including 
that of nature. The ‘primitive text of nature’ is the chaotic being that manifests itself as a 
significant process – and Grenier interprets Nietzsche as saying that chaos is revealed in the 
interplay of nature and mask.43 But, in their very being, nature and mask cohere and Grenier 
echoes one of Nietzsche’s most profound themes when he insists that  it is the foundational 
mistake of metaphysics to put nature and mask in opposition to each other, as if one was the 
mere husk of the other44 I agree with Grenier insomuch as he insists that chaos precludes any 
stark binary valuation. This is an accurate interpretation of Nietzsche’s disdain for binary 
valuations, seen in his famous discussion in Beyond Good and Evil concerning the faith in 
opposing values as the fundamental faith of metaphysicians.45 While the deconstructive 
emphasis on text and interpretation is not directly relevant for my purposes,  this is the 
profoundly Nietzschean point that Derrida has in mind when says that ‘there is nothing outside 
of the text’: Grenier insists that being consists in interpretive activity, and this interpretive 
activity in itself consists in the difference between the interpretation and the text.46  
Hence Nietzsche’s insistence that his opponents did not go far enough. If both parties 
agree that naturalism is the only viable method of investigating moral phenomena but still 
manage to reach radically different conclusions, then the difference between Nietzsche and his 
opponents must lie in their respective ideas of naturalism. Naturalism for the English 
psychologists is a simple suspension of supernatural explanation while for Nietzsche it 
represents a far more radical proposition. Naturalism for them replaces theism as an 
explanatory model, while nature replaces God. Nietzsche considers this an essentially naïve 
understanding of nature – it represents a profound inability to appreciate nature as ‘boundlessly 
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indifferent, without purpose or consideration’.47 For Nietzsche, the death of God lays chaos, 
flux and conflict bare and ‘naturalism’ behaves as his synonym for these things.48 It was 
Nietzsche’s ‘deepest conviction that the death of God could not leave our faith in morality 
unchanged.’49 Nietzsche’s naturalistic genealogy hinges on an appreciation for chaos viz. an 
appreciation that nature is not amenable to any human tyranny, especially that subtlest tyranny, 
philosophy – under which term Nietzsche would doubtless subsume previous attempts at 
genealogical extraction. 
Thus, while the utilitarians dispensed with any supernatural origin for the concepts of 
‘good’, ‘evil’ and ‘truth’, they neglected to dispense with the value of these concepts. They are 
the targets for Nietzsche’s scorn because they are ‘fanatics for morality in spite of their 
atheism’.50 This is what Nietzsche characterizes as their fundamental blindness: they draw a 
suspiciously straight line of descent towards concepts whose value, and right to exist, they have 
already uncritically accepted.  
Nietzsche dramatically highlights this fundamental disparity between his approach and 
the English psychologists’ through a neat trick of rhetoric. He questions why exactly it is that 
the ‘good’ man is automatically esteemed higher than the ‘evil’ man.51 Why is it not the other 
way around? To reframe the question more directly in order to capture the import of 
Nietzsche’s critique: where have we derived this arrogance that the ‘good’ of human beings is 
so much more valuable than the ‘evil’?  
Nietzsche understood that the English psychologists still held on to the Kantian notion 
of an absolute good52, and only differed with regard to how it was to be intellectually sustained. 
They were seeking, in other words, a ‘theology that need not depend on the heart’.53 Therefore 
the problem with the English psychologists is the insufficient depth of their naturalism – they 
have not appreciated that naturalism cannot simply replace the role of theism as an explanatory 
strategy, nor have they clarified the ‘nature’ of their naturalism.  
To draw this circle to a close, I submit that the explanatory strategy that Nietzsche 
employs in his text must fulfil two basic criteria: 1) it must refuse recourse to other-worldly 
sources of explanation 2) it must also avoid the facile naturalism of the utilitarians. I submit 
that the master-slave binary dynamic satisfies these two criteria and allows Nietzsche to launch 
a cogent and coherent investigation. 
 
Master Morality  
The discussion in the Genealogy regarding master morality and slave morality partakes of a 
broader view of reality emphasizing chaos, the role of which in Nietzsche’s thinking I hope I 
have made clear. This chaos is self-contained, for as Zarathustra proclaims, ‘There is no 
outside!’.54 Master morality represents activity but must nonetheless face its ‘inverted image’ 
in the reactivity born along with it viz. slave morality.55 
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One of the first points that Nietzsche makes about master morality is a continuation of 
his attack on his predecessors. Noting the futility of his rivals’ efforts to trace a convenient line 
of descent to the notion of ‘good’ – as if it were the guaranteed common heritage of humanity 
that simply lies in wait to be uncovered – Nietzsche insists that ‘good’ is not created by this 
utilitarian cost-benefit analysis. It was not created ‘by those to whom goodness was shown, 
and which was gradually converted by the force of long custom into the notion of good’.56  
Rather, the ‘good’, like everything else, emerges as a product of conflict. ‘Good’ is an 
epiphenomenon of the master’s casual cruelty in relation to the slave. I interpret, Nietzsche as 
intending something much more fundamental than an agent analysing a situation from a 
distance and then handing out value-judgments; in this time of ‘unsymbolic crudity’, in the 
process of triumphing over the slave, the master is that which is valuable, and he understands 
himself as such.57 The master therefore ‘knows that he is the one who gives honor to things in 
the first place.’58 Masterly morality is inescapably a morality of self-glorification. 
In order to provide a contextualization for the discussion taking place, I refer again to 
the Nietzschean insistence that chaos is synonymous with reality. This chaos manifests as a 
seething vortex of power relations, or, as Deleuze interprets it, a force which is essentially 
related to another force.59 This chaos is essentially neutral, or ‘innocent’ to use one of 
Nietzsche’s favourite terms. Thus the morality of the master is not analysed from the 
perspective of its content – and though Nietzsche often valorises aspects of master morality 
such as strength and courage, the logic of the text insists that the content of the morality must 
be held in abeyance from the very fact of its assertion as primordial activity. Nietzsche will 
assert, in his discussion of the ascetic priest, that a party will instinctively posit values that aid 
its flourishing. Values, and the activity of value-formation, is thus something that can be co-
opted into Nietzsche’s genealogical project as a neutral object of study.  
To reiterate, Nietzsche insists that the ‘good’ is a creation of the good themselves – 
those that have triumphed, and in light of their triumph, are therefore good. But even the use 
of the word ‘creation’, to my mind, serves to obscure the crude animal brutality that engenders 
the primordial ‘good’. Indeed, Nietzsche makes use of etymological evidence to show that very 
early appearances of the word ‘good’ are closely linked with crude markers of class superiority 
– ‘good’ is polysemous with well-born, noble, strong.60 ‘Good’ comes into existence for the 
first time along with the master – or, as Nietzsche succinctly puts it in one of the famous lines 
from the text, ‘political superiority everywhere resolves itself into psychological superiority’61. 
It is only later – when crude animal brutality has been relegated to the shadows – that the moral 
aspect of goodness is ‘separated’, reified by ‘faith in grammar’,62 and becomes accessible to 
all as an ideal worthy of striving towards.  
 For Nietzsche, then, the ‘good’ therefore is not ‘uncovered’ by a fundamentally 
democratic community united by the principle of least harm – the gentle English manner of 
moral devolution. Such an analysis inverts origins. The ‘good’ is born of conquest and 
subjugation, and further, it is born of those who conquer and subjugate, the very ‘good’ ones 
themselves. This ‘good’ of master morality, to anticipate slightly, is not a moral concept in a 
strict sense. Rather it is only the unthinking self-assurance of the master. The suffering of his 
inferiors reflects this immediately back at him,  – and thereby re-enforces his sense of self-
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assurance  – . . A forgotten truth of the human condition, as Nietzsche asserts, is that ‘to see 
suffering does one good, to make suffer, better still.’63 The ‘good’ is therefore a product of an 
inequality that is fundamental to human community.64 In any human society, inequality is the 
rule rather than equality: this follows from the Nietzschean characterization of nature as chaos 
To draw from Nietzsche’s speculations on the state of law later in the text, it appears that a 
state of equal rights represents only a temporary oasis in the surging chaos of power-relations, 
a ‘partial restriction’ of the same.65 That a master class should arise is therefore not a contingent 
state of affairs – to be ‘put right’ by the steady march of enlightenment – but is in keeping with 
the fundamental way in which reality operates.  
Hence, any attempt to quash the fundamental inequality amongst human beings with 
regard to the creation of values can only be accommodated through the thoroughly inadequate 
explanatory avenue of ‘evolution’.66 The primordial creation of good is inseparable from 
victory over inferiors and, more fundamentally, from a felt sense of superiority over the weak. 
Hence the content of master morality – insomuch as it can be said to be a ‘content’ – consists 
of those qualities most conducive to victory in conflict: an overflowing physicality, surety of 
ancient instincts for pillage and cruelty, and relentless activity.67  
Masterly self-assertion is therefore inseparable from the emergence of the good. But 
the counterpart of this emergence is the vanquished and therefore the contemptible – the ‘bad’. 
Nietzsche will set this dichotomy (good/bad) against another dichotomy (good/evil) to 
highlight the fundamental difference between master and slave morality. For the masterly 
‘good’, bad is but a pale after-shadow, the detritus of a simple negation by which is revealed 
the corpus of qualities that have condemned the slave to his inferior position, and contrarily, 
the absence of which has guaranteed the master his elevated rank. In lieu of this, Nietzsche 
embarks on yet another etymological detour, showing that ‘bad’ simply characterizes the lack 
of masterly characteristics and that this lack is tied to crude notions of class inferiority;  ‘bad’ 
everywhere means low, low-born, plebeian, and weak.68 It is this ‘pathos of distance’, the 
keenly felt sense of superiority over one’s inferiors, that allows the master to apprehend and 
casually brush aside this weakness that is not his own with the vague term ‘bad’.69 In a manner 
similar to how the masterly ‘good’ is a brute and unreflective calculus, so too is the ‘bad’ – it 
is simply that which the master is not, and thus requires no further elaboration. That is why it 
is subject to a ‘contempt that is better than hatred’.70 
Nietzsche speculates that even language itself might be a product of masterly self-
assertion, stemming from the instinct to lay claim to reality through sound.71  In any case, 
etymological evidence of masterly disdain for the slave is to be found in ancient vocabulary. 
Rather than associating ‘the good’ with the ‘useful’, Nietzsche’s etymology shows that the 
good was originally the ‘name and celebration of life as it appears in its most powerful 
exemplars.’72 
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He notes that along with ‘noble’, ‘strong’, ‘well-born’ another consonance with the 
masterly ‘good’ is with the ‘truthful’. This is not truth as it is classically treated in the history 
of philosophy; rather, truth in this very primitive state is a personal attribute. It is a 
characteristic of the strong, who are felt to exemplify reality through their already-
demonstrated right to it.73 If lying is the wilful misrepresentation of reality, the strong simply 
have no need to lie given that in them reality itself is re-presented. The truth is therefore not 
pristinely encapsulated in a Platonic realm, to be accessed through elaborate argumentation or 
disinterested contemplation – the Nietzschean claim is rather that, in its original state, the truth 
is an emergent phenomena alongside the good, and both come into being with the truthful and 
the good himself, the primordial master.  
The master partakes more easily than the slave in that fundamental characteristic of 
reality – restless activity and energy, and a creative and fundamentally joyful dissatisfaction. 
He ‘consecrates his instinctual power as something ‘good’.74 Being more rooted in this reality 
than the slave, he is completely transparent with regard to himself. Etymology is employed 
again to show that the master is always tied in various ancient languages to words that mean 
forthrightness, truthfulness, and perhaps naivete.75  
Before I move on to the elucidation of slave morality, I will note here very briefly (and 
perhaps tangentially) that, while Nietzsche’s exuberant style lends itself to a romanticisation of 
master morality, he is talking about a dynamic that has roots in a very ancient past – a time of 




Slave Morality  
Slave morality is the mirror image of master morality. In its totality, it is a reaction to the 
depredations of master morality, and is not active, precisely because of this constitutional 
subjection to depredation.77 If the master primordially represents activity within the human 
sphere, the slave represents conversely primordial reactivity. Thus, slave morality has as its 
raison d’être master morality; the qualities that comprise slave morality have as their common 
theme the effort to negate master morality.  
I will hence first focus on the role that slave morality plays as the counterpoint to master 
morality, before going on to highlight some of what Nietzsche considers to be the concrete 
manifestations of slave morality. To reiterate, slave morality has as its entire basis the negation 
of master morality. This negation, however, needs to be distinguished from the negation that 
the master performs as a matter of course in his project of self-affirmation. The master’s 
negation is not fundamental to his being in the manner that the slave’s negation is. The 
negating-activity of the slave is wholly determined from the outset by the monolith of master 
morality, under whose thumb it begins its existence.  
In the Genealogy, Nietzsche describes how this reversal of master morality – the 
‘reversal of the evaluating gaze’ – takes place.78 To reiterate, the creation of the good is 
inseparable from the self-assertion of the master and is one with him. The slave, bereft as he is 
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of the privilege of independent action, is thus precluded from any share in genuine value-
creation, that of the primordial ‘good’. What the slave can ‘create’, however, is the 
condemnation of the master as evil.79 Similar to the manner in which the good comes into being 
for the first time with the master, evil enters the world with the slave, but instead of the 
unreflective self-glorification of the master we find in this case an acutely self-conscious and 
fundamentally other-directed victimhood.  
For Nietzsche, evil is the only creation of the slave, but it is not a creation born out of 
activity. Indeed, even the term ‘creation’ is inappropriate to this reaction of the slave. The 
raison d’être for slave morality is the master – for ‘slave morality from the outset says ‘no’ on 
principle to everything that is outside.’80 He looms large in their vision to the exclusion of all 
else. The denunciation of ‘evil’ is irrevocably tied to the slave’s instinct of self-preservation.  
The master possesses surety of instinct and relies upon this as he lays claim to the world. 
The slave’s instincts for cruelty and conquest are nowhere near as sharp as the masters’; that 
which gives the latter his mastery over the world, and that which has made the slave’s life a 
pitiful torment.81 The crucial thing to remember about slave morality – and the key to 
understanding the devastating effects of Nietzsche’s genealogies – is that what eventually 
mutates into a general condemnation always has its origins in a specific condemnation of a 
specific type of human being i.e. the master. The hatred of the body that is a characteristic of 
ressentiment and its outgrowths such as the ascetic ideal, has its beginnings in the slaves’ 
fearful condemnation of the rapacity of the master. This subsequently mutates into a general 
condemnation of all instincts – and the body that houses them – lest from these emerge the old 
horror of the master. This is, in essence, Nietzsche’s outline of the development of culture and 
civilization as the long process of ‘taming’ the animal man.82  
On a tangential note, I would here, following Nietzsche,83 draw attention to the unique 
evolution of Indian vegetarianism as a possible example of slavish wariness of instinctive 
rapacity. It is not my intention to draw a direct link between ressentiment and the moral 
underpinnings of vegetarianism – which, even if plausible, is a project both large and fraught 
with interpretive difficulties – but certain elements of the Indian tradition do announce 
themselves in the context of the Nietzschean characterization of slave morality. The 
condemnation of certain categories of foods – most obviously that of meat, but also 
intriguingly, garlic and onion – is explicitly connected to the conviction that these foods ‘arouse 
base desires’.84 I notice here the remnant of a millennia-old suspicion of the chaotic potentiality 
of instinct. The diet that tends to be condemned in the Indian tradition is termed rajasic – the 
given definition of rajasic foods are those which tend to stimulate passion and ‘increase the 
energy of the body’.85 I note that the term ‘rajasic’ is formed from the Indo-European root ‘raj’, 
which means king; and has several cognates in the same language family, such as ‘rex.’ The 
diet that tends to be recommended in the system of Indian vegetarianism is termed sattvic, and 
by this is meant foods which promote equanimity, meditation, and clear thinking.86 Nietzsche 
in the Gay Science explicitly mentions ‘Indian gurus’ who wish to impose a vegetarian diet on 
the masses, precisely because these diets promote a ‘narcotic way of thinking and feeling’.87 
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What the Indian tradition considers sattvic, Nietzsche considers narcotic. The omnipresent 
threat of the master is neutralized by dietary restrictions, sanctified by a medico-moral 
approach. In the same section, Nietzsche even speculates that the narcotic effects of a 
vegetarian diet are useful to the gurus, who having ‘created and strengthened a need’ are now 
in a position to ‘satisfy it’.88 I draw attention to Nietzsche’s later remarks concerning the ascetic 
priest – if the archetypal Indian guru can be considered an example of the ascetic priest, which 
I believe is a fair characterization – when he says the priest has to wound before he can cure.89  
The denigration of physicality belongs to slave morality and it is only as a by-product 
of this denigration that the subsequent elevation of consciousness – ‘that most impoverished 
and error-prone organ’– is inaugurated.90 But this appreciation for mind is a reactive by-product 
of the initial condemnation of masterly instinct. It is an example of the ‘good’ of the slaves 
being the reactive residue from their condemnation of the master. 
The masters assert themselves against their inferiors and therefore find their raison 
d’être in inequality. The masterly elements in all societies of every time and place have 
therefore always found themselves most at home in a rigid class system composed of superiors 
and inferiors. In such a patently unequal social setup, they more clearly and easily see their 
obvious supremacy reflected back at them through the poor conditions of their inferiors. The 
master feels intuitively that inequality is written in the fabric of reality. For the slave, on the 
other hand, inequality and the predations that are coequal with it are to be condemned as evil.91 
For the slave, ‘good’ means equality – which, Nietzsche says, means ‘levelling’.92 Protection 
in numbers and the avoidance of any disturbance of the peace and stability of the herd is 
guaranteed by the binding nature of the self-conception ‘good’.  
For the master, activity and joy in this activity are what constitutes an unreflective 
happiness for him; this serves as the proof of his right to the world. He also possess the 
primitive wisdom of ‘not separating happiness from action.’93 For the slave, however, 
independent action possesses a huge existential risk; not only is he constitutionally less capable 
of this – lacking the surety of instinct that characterizes the master’s free flowing action – but 
to act independently would be to venture into the master’s traditional domain and perhaps to 
risk a swift retribution. The slave is therefore fundamentally afraid, and not inclined to ‘build 
his city next to Vesuvius’;94 happiness for him is essentially a respite from life – rest, inactivity 
and sabbath.95 The master ‘has no need to compare his happiness to someone else’s, to convince 
himself that he is happy’, which is precisely what the slave does.96 Nonetheless, deprived of 
his share of life, the slave makes full use of his remaining power of imaginative condemnation 
to label the master evil. Because he does not behave like a master – or, as Nietzsche puts it, is 
simply not ‘strong enough’ to do so – he consoles himself that he is therefore ‘good’.97  
This compulsion to lie to himself is the tragedy of the slave. He does not have the easy 
self-transparency of the master, their easy naivete; being at a remove from reality, he lacks the 
capacity for transparency with regard to himself. In addition, some semblance of a self-
preservative instinct is here at play in slave morality, that compels him to habitually lie to 
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himself with regard to himself. The slave cannot stand the truth of his own impotence, and thus 
camouflages his soul with his self-designation of good.  
This ineradicable tendency to lie to himself and to camouflage his impotence with the 
term ‘good’ is the characteristic of slave morality (as well as being one of the primary 
responsibilities of the ascetic priest, which I shall soon come to) – and this tendency is 
amplified by the ‘faith in grammar’. In the Genealogy, Nietzsche notes that this tendency to 
believe in the separation of the actor from their action plays a crucial role in supporting the 
camouflage of the slave. Recent interpretations emphasize this imaginative separation of his 
‘soul’ from his action – or lack thereof – and the tendency of the slave to invest a store of 
imaginary power within this new phantom.98 He can convince himself that he could act thus if 
he wanted to, but simply chooses not to, because he is good.99 By means of his inviolable soul, 
he has desisted from ‘evil’ action. 
This is what Deleuze terms the primary role of reactive forces – being the shadow image 
of activity, their role is to negate activity. But because of their essential reactivity, their negation 
of activity takes the form of separating activity from what it can do. Leaving aside Deleuze’s 
meditation on Nietzsche’s metaphysics (or lack thereof), I believe that the argument can be 
imported with a simple substitution of ‘ressentiment’ for that of any talk of a reactive force. 
This is why Nietzsche can say that the primary weapon of slaves is a ‘movable host of 
metaphors’:100 the belief in free will, the invention of a God in opposition to gods, the belief in 
an afterlife comprised either of punishment or bliss. All of these have as their true aim the 
suppression of chaos, represented in the Genealogy by the alien restlessness of the master. This 
goal is accomplished through the insidious insertion of these layers of fiction between the agent 
and his activity.  
This decisive moment – the phantom of the soul born from resentful imagination – turns 
up related quandaries such as the role of free will and moral responsibility, which will not 
detain me here. It is perhaps sufficient to note that the concept of free will is extremely valuable 
from the perspective of slave morality. The edifice of morality collapses without the notion of 
free will, but we are loath to acknowledge ‘man’s complete lack of responsibility for his 
behaviour and for his nature.’101 
 Nietzsche says that the combination of these factors – constant subjection to predation, 
risk-averseness, a lack of physicality, a concomitant reification of consciousness – leads to a 
‘race of men of far greater cunning and cleverness’ that eventually prove to be the undoing of 
the previously dominant master morality.102 For the latter, cleverness is a vaguely dangerous 
luxury, something that could potentially get in the way of their surety of instinct.  
Nietzsche’s account of human reality is one that is a mirror of chaos, much like any 
other aspect of nature. Human reality is ceaselessly generative and, as a fundamental 
constituent of this generative power, riven through with non-congruent power-relations. The 
master-slave explanatory model serves Nietzsche’s aim of genealogically extracting the myriad 
origins of contemporary moral orientations. In the next chapter, I discuss one of these origins, 
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CHAPTER 2: Ressentiment 
 
“These worm-eaten physiological casualties are all men of ressentiment, a whole, 
vibrating realm of subterranean revenge, inexhaustible and insatiable in its 
eruptions against the happy”  
- On The Genealogy of Morality, 
Third Essay 
 
In this chapter, I will focus on Nietzsche’s account regarding the origin of ressentiment within 
the ambit of the master-slave dynamic as well as its role there. My aim in doing so will be to 
isolate ressentiment as a phenomenon and identify it with a particular strategy within an intra-
species conflict. This will be preparatory to my reconstructive interpretation of philosophy as 
originating in ressentiment.  
The concept of ressentiment will therefore be interpreted in two distinct ways. Firstly, 
ressentiment will be considered a reactivity that mutates into a motive force for a party within 
an intra-species conflict viz. the slave. Secondly, having made this identification of 
ressentiment with a motive force that thereafter becomes synonymous with a personality type, 
ressentiment will be considered as a weapon that is wielded by one party against the other in a 
subterranean, ideological war. This coincidence of motivation and weapon will serve as the 
guiding principle for this chapter and allow me a plausible interpretation for philosophy itself 
being the synthesis of these two themes.  
 
Motivation: The Origin of Ressentiment  
In order to do justice to the aim of characterizing ressentiment as a motive force, I will rely on 
Nietzsche’s account of how and why ressentiment appears. Schacht says Nietzsche’s guiding 
idea is the naturalization of our understanding of ourselves that becomes necessary upon the 
realization that ‘the kind of world this world is, is the only kind of world and reality there is, 
with no particular configuration of it being essential or fundamental to it.’103 This is what 
Nietzsche elsewhere dramatically describes as the ‘death of God’. 
Nietzsche’s naturalism is thus predicated on an understanding of change as the 
transformation of ‘what was already going on and had already come to be.’104 The ‘end-state’ 
of a final equilibrium – democracy, for example – is not simply undesirable for Nietzsche, but 
also untenable. Any society will resolve itself into a master-slave dynamic as a matter of course.  
The incessant movement implied by Nietzsche’s naturalism means that the masters 
keep looking for spoils and enemies.105 In so doing, they embrace the chaos of reality to master 
it to their advantage. In their ‘overflowing physicality’ and passion for adventure, they run up 
against the slaves, who bear the brunt of these overpowering (in the literal sense of the word) 
qualities.106 The master’s subjugation of the slave, despite its brutality, can never be final; this 
is where the Nietzschean emphasis on chaos comes into play. Insomuch as Nietzsche’s 
philosophical project hinges upon an image of nature as ‘chaos for all eternity’, Deleuze insists 
that chaos can only be approximated in thought by an image wherein active meets reactive in 
an unending tussle – where active and reactive are the ‘original qualities which express the 
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relation of force with force’ and which thus serves as a microcosm of nature.107 Deleuze’s 
attempt at constructing a Nietzschean metaphysics is not my project here. However, I do find 
his imagery useful in illustrating the master-slave dynamic. For if the nature of the world is 
indeed ‘chaos for all eternity’, there is no final state of affairs, even for the masterly element. 
The slave too is always in motion, insomuch as he is part of nature, but this is not, and cannot 
be, the free-flowing activity of their superiors. This does not mean, however, that he abdicates 
his necessity to express himself.  
It is in this that the root of ressentiment is to be found. The force of the term lies in its 
reference to the peculiarly nonactive nature of this reaction – the ‘inability to rid oneself of 
worms.’108 Ressentiment is therefore a reaction come by honestly in the course of human 
affairs, but which cannot act itself out and which is rather sublimated into an imaginary 
revenge, through which the slave hopes to hit back against the depredations of the master.109  
Nietzsche characterizes ressentiment as a phenomenon that afflicts masters as well. The 
identification of the master with pure activity must be complicated by the recognition that the 
master can also be reactive; in chaos, after all, no agent is entirely self-supporting. However, 
the reactivity of the masters is limited because it is always immediately acted upon due to their 
omnipresent ‘thirst for enemies’ and relentless activity. It is this difference that grants the 
master his nobility and that clarifies the nature of ressentiment. With the masters, reactivity 
threatens to darkly bloom into ressentiment. It is extirpated almost immediately and thus ‘does 
not poison’.110 
Nietzsche in his discussion of the master emphasizes the master’s fundamentally active 
nature. This activity of the master is one that possesses great plasticity, for the master is 
someone whose ‘superabundance of power which is flexible, formative, healing and can make 
one forget.’.111 The master is defined by movement, and the immense capacity for form-giving 
exemplified by the ‘involuntary and unconscious’ artists of the first states.112 It is this 
movement, easy and abundant forgetfulness, and form-giving plasticity that precludes 
ressentiment from taking root in the master in the many cases where it would inevitably arise 
in the slave.  
Thus, ressentiment must graduate from a physiological reaction that can and should be 
exhausted immediately – like a sneeze, to use a slightly frivolous example – into a hardened 
motive force integrated with a particular variety of human psychology. This step is crucial, if 
ressentiment is to produce moral valuations. To reiterate, the slaves are ‘burrowed with worms’ 
they have not the strength to shake off.113 Bereft of the capacity to hit back and  politically 
impotent, the slave’s ressentiment stagnates and fuses with his personality as a poisonous 
motive.  
A brief unpacking of the causality of this phenomenon can be found in Max Scheler’s 
classic monograph. While somewhat outdated and lacking a true appreciation for the massive 
scope of Nietzsche’s conception, Scheler nonetheless understands how ressentiment evolves 
and solidifies itself from repeated minor humiliations that have not been resolved. In other 
words, it is characterized by the ‘repeated experiencing and reliving of a particular emotional 
response against someone else’.114 To use a convenient analogy, the solidification of 
ressentiment into a hardened motive force can be compared with Freud’s theory of repetition 
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compulsion. Scheler goes on to state that it is precisely this continued re-experiencing of the 
original affect that – to borrow from psychoanalytic language once again –eventually fuses it 
with the personality while simultaneously removing it from purview of the ego.  
Wallace’s speculations regarding the matter of the motivation for the slave – whether he truly 
wishes to harm the master, or if the construct of ‘good/evil’ is not so much a matter of 
instrumental rationality as it is one of a more accurate emotional self-interpretation – are not 
directly relevant to my query.115 For my purposes going forward, it is enough that to note that 
ressentiment emerges in the context of a strict class hierarchy that permanently withholds 
redress from the slave that leads to the solidification of ressentiment as a motive force for a 
‘revolt in morals.’ 
 
Ressentiment as Weapon: The Slave Revolt in Morality  
I mentioned in the introduction to this chapter that the full implications of the slave’s 
ressentiment could only be properly understood if we interpret this phenomenon through two 
distinct but complementary prisms – as motivation, and as weapon.  
I believe that the brief sketch offered in the previous section has served to contextualize 
the origin of ressentiment and its transformation into a motive force that is compelled to express 
itself. But, as Nietzsche notes, the key factor in the slave’s ressentiment is the lack of outlet for 
the frustrations experienced at repeated injustices – his compulsion to ‘play dead in the face of 
great danger’.116 So what is the form that an essentially impotent revenge takes? Nietzsche 
replies: the slave revolt in morals.117  
While the slave pushback against the master is a constant in human affairs – insomuch 
as Nietzsche insists the master-slave dynamic necessarily pertains to all societies – Nietzsche 
identifies the slave revolt in morals as being Jewish-led, inasmuch as the Jewish people are the 
‘priestly people par excellence’.118 It is the Jewish people’s ‘most deliberate revenge’ that 
comprises the slave revolt in morals, and Nietzsche says that the ‘symbol of this fight’ is ‘Rome 
against Judea, Judea against Rome.’119 By this he means the process by which Roman values 
– the manifestation of master morality in this time and place – are subject to a bitter 
revaluation.120The revolt stems from the self-protective instincts of the slave insomuch as the 
self-designation ‘good’ ensures the bonding of the herd against the oppressor. When the slaves 
become conscious of their majority in the population, that the slave revolt in morals graduates 
from being a solipsistic salve for this segment of the population to the defining moral character 
of an entire civilization. Now, it successfully establishes a framework through which a partial 
release from the pressure of impotent hatred through the mechanism of an imaginary and 
spiritualized revenge can be accomplished. However, deeply aware of their impotence and 
quasi-ashamed of their total incorporation within herd psychology, the slave finds existential 
succour in the project of his individual ‘salvation’.121 But this salvation – much like any other 
component of the slave life-project – is only a generalized abstraction of its true target; by 
salvation is meant salvation from the master, ergo salvation from one’s own existence as 
slave.122 The cohesion of the herd, and the phenomenon of herd mentality itself, is to be found 
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in this Janus-like formulation; salvation is a project that the master is excluded from, precisely 
because it is a salvation from the master. What Nietzsche has in mind with the identification of 
the slave revolt in morals is also a comment on the nature of history;  or, to be more specific, 
the teleological understanding of history.  The servile salvation project lends a teleology to 
human life.123 Nietzsche’s thought experiment of the eternal recurrence is precisely an effort 
to undo the incipient nihilism of any salvation project insomuch as such projects inevitably 
partake of the slavish desire to ‘turn away’ from this life.  
The slave revolt in morals is not a steady inevitable march of progress towards 
civilization. Nietzsche persists throughout his corpus in his admiration for ancient peoples. For 
Nietzsche, the ‘progress of history’ is nonsense, the latest manifestation of slave morality’s 
nihilistic project. The slave revolt in morals was therefore a temporary strategy in an intra-
species conflict that proved successful. As Nietzsche avers, the success of this strategy, and 
indeed, its very nature as strategy, has been lost sight of, precisely because of its’ success. The 
curiosity of this success however is that the slave revolt has no idea what to do with its victory. 
Born from impotence, risk-averseness, and a fundamental lack of creativity, the slave is 
incapable of acting or genuine value-creation, and can therefore only look outside himself in a 
spirit of bitterness – hence, Nietzsche’s bombastic diagnoses of the continued degeneration of 
man, the catastrophic incubation of the will to nothingness, and the need for the revaluation of 
values.  
 
The ‘creativity’ of ressentiment and the master’s downfall 
Nietzsche argues that the slave revolt in morals is the result of ressentiment itself becoming 
‘creative and giving birth to values’.124 I find this evidence of a contradiction; if genuine 
creativity, understood in the context of value-creation, is a project beyond the reach of the slave 
– a point Nietzsche emphasizes with his characterization of ressentiment’s creativity being 
basically a reaction125  – whither the slave revolt? More crucially, how is it that the master, 
possessed of the strength and will of the world, succumbs to a thoroughly reactive grouping?  
I believe that the statement ‘ressentiment becomes creative’ has to be qualified; I do 
not believe that the word ‘creative’ is used here in the same sense that Nietzsche intends when 
he is discussing the master. The ‘creativity’ that lies behind the slave revolt in morals is not 
genuinely productive of anything, but is merely an accumulation driven by inertia. Nietzsche 
will identify the slave revolt in morals with the genius of the ascetic priest – a figure whom I 
will discuss later – but this genius merely lies in the spiritualization of the reactivity of 
ressentiment; the genius of the priest is the genius of ressentiment made concrete insomuch as 
the fundamental aim of ressentiment is the separation of the active from his activity.  
As to why master morality succumbs to the slave revolt, again the figure of the priest 
is key. As Migotti puts it, the master succumbs to a fatal self-doubt engineered by the slave 
revolt in morals and specifically by the ascetic priest.126 That it is fundamentally important for 
the strong to be sheltered from the weak is a notorious Nietzschean refrain.127 The reason for 
his emphasis on the same is because of the success of the slave revolt in morals; as clear a case 
of the weak infecting the strong with self-hatred and self-doubt. The inculcation of self-doubt 
cannot be accomplished without the inculcation of a sense of responsibility over oneself. To 
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educate the master in the existence of his soul, isolated from his body, is to incorporate within 
him a constraint fashioned out of guilt. 
Migotti asserts that all of this is nonetheless beside the point: why would the master 
even humour the propaganda of the slaves, given his disdain for them and the aloofness which 
he maintains himself with regard to them? Migotti states that what truly led the master to accept 
the ‘Trojan Horse’ of slave morality is his dialectical incompetence. The masters were not 
unfamiliar with the art of persuasion, having honoured a tradition amongst themselves that 
emphasized discourse rather than force in the settling of disputes. They were therefore 
amenable to argument, but their incompetence arose from their inexperience with the 
developed art of argumentation that characterizes the slave and his representative, the priest. 
This more skilled argumentation arises for structural reasons, viz. the increased respectability 
of cunning and cleverness amongst essentially reactive populations.128 
Nietzsche’s account of the slave revolt in morals is an example of weaponized ressentiment 
dedicated to the ‘creation of the tame animal out of the beast man.’129 Nietzsche also notes that, 
for all its ignominious origins and ambitions, the slave revolt in morals made man an 
‘interesting animal’.130 Also associated with the victory of ressentiment is the rise of cleverness 
– or, to be more accurate, the increased respectability of cleverness.131  
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CHAPTER 3: Bad Conscience  
 
“Alas for this crazy, pathetic beast man! What ideas he has, what perversity, what 
hysterical nonsense, what bestiality of thought immediately erupts, the moment 
he is prevented, if only gently, from being a beast in deed!”  
- Genealogy of Morality, 2nd Essay  
 
 
In the previous chapters, I provided an outline of the way in which Nietzsche’s naturalistic 
mode of analysis can account for moral phenomena. The previous two chapters traced the 
development of master morality and slave morality, as well as the role that ressentiment plays 
in the conflict between the two.  
In this chapter, the first part of a two-part discussion, I will move on to the crux of my 
thesis, viz. the link between ressentiment and philosophy. I begin this chapter with the analysis 
of the phenomenon of ‘bad conscience’. I interpret ‘bad conscience’ as the culmination of a 
certain logic of memory and guilt, and in tracing this phenomenon, I will interpret the 
philosopher as an individual seized by bad conscience who in turn seizes upon the discipline 
of philosophy as a means of self-torture.  
 
Memory, guilt and bad conscience  
The phenomenon of bad conscience is the culmination of a particular logic of memory and 
guilt.  
How does memory arise? In a reversal of the usual order, Nietzsche insists that 
forgetfulness is not a failure of memory and that it is rather memory that indicates a failure of 
forgetting. Forgetfulness represents great health – ‘positive in the strongest sense of the 
word’132 – and suggests the ability to ‘properly digest one’s experiences’ and move ceaselessly 
forward in the tumult of life.133 Nietzsche thus imputes to an over-severe memory a nature akin 
to ‘dyspepsia’, or a ‘constantly festering wound’.134 He insists that while one may live happily 
without memory (like animals do) it would be altogether ‘impossible to live at all without 
forgetting.’135 
Memory – or to be more accurate, the severe intensification of memory that runs 
parallel to Nietzsche’s ‘interiorization’ of man – must thus take the form of an imposition from 
outside. Here again is the Nietzschean emphasis on conflict as the site for myriad origins. In 
this case, conflict provides an origin for the intensification of memory. Memory is not only 
something that we have – it is also something that is reinforced. This reinforcement is an 
imposition. 
What is the motivation for this imposition? Nietzsche answers: the motivation for 
intensification of memory is to replace ‘the partly dull, partly idiotic and inattentive animal 
man’ with a sober and restrained creature that can make and keep promises.136 Why is it so 
important for man to keep promises? Because a creature that is constantly mindful of his 
 
132 Nietzsche, On The Genealogy of Morality, (2 :§1), 36 
133 Ibid., §1 35 
133 Ibid., §1 35 
134 Nietzsche, Ecce Homo, §6, 80 
135 Nietzsche, Untimely Meditations, 62 
136 Nietzsche, On The Genealogy of Morality, (2 : §3), 38 
obligation is a predictable creature, a uniform ‘peer amongst his peers’.137 The real motivation 
for the intensification of memory is the transformation of chaotic innocence into a regularized 
cell of community living.   
Here, I would reiterate the nature of ressentiment, that it aims to separate the active 
from his activity. The discussion concerning memory and guilt is thus contextualized by a 
society which is in the beginning grips of reactive ressentiment. The chaos of innocent activity 
is to be replaced by various fictions, such as guilt and obligation, which will darkly colour 
memory from here on out.  
An animal saddled with permanent obligation thus emerges with the rise of settled 
community life. This transformation did not occur gently. It was accomplished, like ‘every 
great thing in the world’, through bloodshed.138 More specifically, it was accomplished by 
means of what Nietzsche characterizes as the oldest psychology in the world viz. the crude link 
between pain and mnemonics.139 Nietzsche makes the point that all of ancient man’s concepts 
were ‘initially understood as crude, direct and unsymbolic.’140 The emergence of memory-as-
wound meant that a great deal of freedom was quite deliberately erased from the world.  
The term ‘obligation’ – the rationale for memory – has been left unremarked upon. 
With the discussion of guilt, I hope to shed some further light on the nature of obligation. 
Nietzsche discusses the phenomenon of guilt in some detail in the second essay. Once again, 
his analysis of guilt revolves around removing it from its pedestal as a self-evident value 
formation and instead resituating it as deriving from our basest instincts. He makes the 
etymological connection between debt (Schulden) and guilt (Schuld)141. This is introduced after 
his discussion on the transformation of memory into responsibility through the effect of the 
‘long morality of custom’. With the connection between debt and guilt, Nietzsche reemphasizes 
the obligation inculcated within primitive man towards his community. The notion of guilt as 
an abstraction  – a state of the soul  – is only a very recent interpretation of an ancient imperative 
to honour one’s obligations, to honour one’s debts in other words, and the failure thereof. The 
commercial-legalistic connotation of the word debt is explicitly brought to the forefront by 
Nietzsche when he says that the debtor-creditor relationship is an old one – and one which is 
as old as the concept of the ‘legal subject’, therefore, as old as the creation of the sovereign 
individual able to make and keep promises.142 The idea is not simply to claim that the abstract 
notion of guilt is a linear development from the debtor-creditor relationship; the point is that 
this relationship is the paradigm for human sociability incumbent upon settled living. The idea 
that every ‘injury has its equivalent’ – even if, in this primitive age, the equivalent is not money 
but simply the infliction of pain upon the aggressor – stems from this dynamic.143 Guilt in this 
understanding is only the introjection of the diffuse cruelty incumbent upon settled living – 
man remaining wolf to man, but the wolves being trapped in a cage. 
Guilt begins in a crude fear over unpaid debts and is subsequently sublimated into an 
attribute of the soul. It is only through the ‘moralization’ of debt into that of guilt – a process 
which, Ridley144 avers, is logically prior to a god – that the material roots of obligation are 
hidden. The severe intensification of memory is motivated by the desire of the creditor to 
enforce payment of debts. The debtor must be constantly ‘mindful’ of his obligation. Guilt is 
closely linked to the obligation – and potential failure – to pay one’s debts. It is thus closely 
 
137 Ibid., (2: §2), 36  
138 Ibid., (2: §3) 38 
139 Ibid., (2: §3) 38 
140 Ibid., (1: §6) 15 
141 Ibid.,, (2: §4) 39 
142 Ibid., (2: §4) 40 
143 Ibid., (2: §4) 40 
144 Ridley. “Guilt Before God, or God Before Guilt? The Second Essay of Nietzsche's Genealogy.”  35–45 
linked to memory. A common theme in Nietzsche – and one which I dwelt upon in my 
discussion of his genealogical method – is that phenomena become subject to differing, 
competing interpretations over time. If an interpretation is considered to be a manifestation of 
force – and indeed, Grenier suggests that, ‘for Nietzsche, interpretation is the creative 
imposition of form upon matter’145 – memory becomes subject to this new force, and charged 
with the responsibility of maintaining guilt. 
Having drawn this identification, I will show how bad conscience is the culmination of 
a complex of guilt, memory and the logic of compensation. Nietzsche engages in a long 
discussion of this last topic, deconstructing the phenomenon from its current status as a purely 
rational-legalistic concept (where every debt can be ‘paid off’) and exposing its roots in a much 
more primitive calculus.146 The primordial compensation for a creditor unable to collect his 
debt from the debtor is the opportunity to engage in cruelty against the latter.147 The pleasure 
of cruelty is itself the compensation. Guilt is over a long history incorporated within the human 
animal by the terror of the cruelties that will be visited upon them should they fail to honour 
their obligation. A failure of memory is potentially disastrous for a debtor.  
The debtor-creditor dynamic is also present in the relationship between the individual 
and his community. The individual gains the benefits of the community and thus exists in a 
state of debt towards them.148 Punishing a criminal in modern society – through the imposition 
of a jail term that is supposedly commensurate with the crime – is a sublimated version of a 
much more primitive desire to extract compensation through the infliction of cruelty.  
Nietzsche describes the emergence of conscience as the crowning jewel of a drawn-out 
and otherwise idiotically cruel process of the ‘morality of custom’. When man is made regular 
unto himself, he gains a pride at his newfound dominion over himself. Conscience creates the 
feeling of responsibility and pride therein.149  ‘Bad conscience’ is the result of the primitive 
and untamed man suddenly being forced into the confines of society.150 It therefore represents 
the corruption of conscience and the perversion of the feeling of responsibility – hitherto man’s 
pride – into an all-encompassing guilt. It is the triumph of reactive forces that have succeeded 
in hindering active forces by rendering the latter useless. But this does not mean that the active 
forces have ceased to function. The ‘bad’ in ‘bad conscience’ has the non-moralistic 
signification of faulty, or malfunctioning. It is a previously healthy organ become unhealthy 
due to a change in external circumstances. It is the active forced into reactivity. To interpret it 
with reference to the master-slave dynamic, bad conscience is the result of the slave’s infecting 
the master with his lifestyle of self-denigration and self-sabotage; the essence of the bad 
conscience is the resolute acting against one’s one interests as a striving organism. The healthy 
conscience by this reckoning must be the masters’ unselfconscious assertion of his will, direct 
and absent of circumambulation. The ‘infection’ of bad conscience therefore means that  
animal man’s previously unrestrained exercise of cruelties upon the world around him is now 
redirected against himself. What follows is a disastrous interiorization, occasioned by the 
‘oppressive narrowness and conformity of custom’, which amounts to a self-prosecution.151  
Ressentiment, being responsible for the rise of civilization, is thus responsible for the 
proliferation of ‘bad conscience’. But on an individual level, most commentators regard bad 
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conscience as a phenomenon that is most exhibited by the slavish, those at the bottom of the 
social ladder.152 It is precisely because they have no outlets for aggression – the historical 
privilege of master morality – that they are the most likely to internalize it and vent it upon 
themselves. Thus, ‘bad conscience’ arises due to the structural necessity of controlling the 
individual within a community. The fuel for this cruelty is provided by guilt – a guilt that is 
interpreted as self-inadequacy in the face of an obligation.  
But it is when guilt becomes ossified in the human psyche that ‘bad conscience’ is 
established. Guilt mutates into despair when the prospect of a permanent inability of repayment 
of a debt makes itself felt. This occurs when generations have lived in settled communities. In 
a manner similar to the way in which the individual exists in debt to the community, the 
community exists in parallel debt to its forefathers, who are interpreted as the creditors of the 
community’s continued prosperity and cohesiveness. In a quasi-anthropological manner, 
Nietzsche links the emergence of the first gods with the debt to these long dead creditors.153 
As time goes on and the weight of history ‘pushes (animal man) down or bends him 
sideways’, guilt becomes magnified precisely in proportion to the extent to which it is 
interpreted as unredeemable.154 Guilt mutates into despair. Drowning in memory, the 
individual tortures himself in an effort to make a spectacle of his suffering, in the hope that this 
will suffice as a form of payment.   
The important point to note is that the most sublimated forms of this self-torture 
(religion, nihilism, the will to nothingness of Buddhism are all included in this account, being 
essentially forms of bitterness against a forever absent creditor) still partake of the debt-cruelty 
matrix.155 In the absence of the creditor to inflict the punishment, the debtor does it himself. 
Nietzsche stresses the link between bad conscience, guilt, and suffering.  
The propensity of philosophers to reach for the most abstract, universal conclusions in 
an essentially mutable reality has its origin in bad conscience as well. Imprisoned within the 
bounds of society, pressurized into nothingness by the weight of several creditor generations, 
raging cruelly against himself, man appropriates any instrument he can find in order to torture 
himself more exquisitely.156Religion, Nietzsche says, has its staying power precisely in this 
regard, in that it provides the perfect subterfuge for man’s disguised cruelty. The easiest way 
to ‘provide his self-torture with its most horrific hardness and sharpness’157 is by contrasting 
his messy and multitudinous instincts with an impossible counterimage, that of the perfect and 
sublime God.  
I argue that the leap from this state of affairs to that of the archetypal philosopher – 
searching always for the most abstract and the most general, the better to torture his own 
imperfect and resolutely unmetaphysical nature with – is not a large leap at all.  
 
 
CHAPTER 4: The Ascetic Ideal  
 
“This hatred of the human, and even more of the animalistic, even more of the 
material, this horror of the senses, of reason itself, this fear of happiness and 
 
152 Ridley, “Guilt Before God, or God Before Guilt? The Second Essay of Nietzsche's Genealogy.”  35–45. 
 
153 Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morality, (2: §19) 61 
154 Nietzsche, Untimely Meditations, 54 
155 Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morality, (2: §21) 63  
156 Ibid., (2: §22) 63 
157 Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morality, (2: §22) 63 
beauty, this longing to get away from appearance, transience, growth, death, 
wishing, longing itself”  
On The Genealogy of Morality, Third Essay 
 
 
This chapter is divided into three sections. In the first section, I will discuss the structural role 
of the ascetic ideal, and how it factors into Nietzsche’s explanatory economy in the Genealogy. 
Secondly, I will focus on the relationship between the phenomenon of ressentiment and that of 
the ascetic ideal, particularly focusing upon the figure wherein these two strands are united, 
viz. the ascetic priest. Finally, I conclude with a section investigating the link between the 
ascetic ideal and philosophy as it is traditionally conceived.  
 
Structural role of the ascetic ideal  
Nietzsche’s analysis of the ascetic ideal takes up most of the third essay of the Genealogy. He 
introduces the topic as a fundamental paradox, an absurdity wherein life seems to deny itself 
and will its own self-destruction. The paradox, however, is only apparent. Nietzsche insists that 
the human animal ‘prefers to will nothingness than not will’ at all.158 The phraseology indicates 
a more subjectivist connotation than what I take Nietzsche to really intend; what he has in mind 
is encapsulated in the dictum ‘nature abhors a vacuum’, here in the context of human drives. 
This brief detour into an ontological reading of the statement is contextualized by Nietzsche’s 
overall metaphysical concerns – if this is an appropriate term to use at all, as I will soon briefly 
discuss – evinced throughout his corpus, under the broad heading of ‘the will to power’ viz., 
reality being characterized by flux and ceaseless becoming, a ‘monster of energy, without 
beginning and end’, and the concomitant constant interplay of drives and forces.159  
My reading here is based on Heidegger’s lecture courses, wherein he sees the will to 
power as the endpoint of the history of Western metaphysics. Recent commentators who have 
similarly viewed the will to power as an ontological motif include Deleuze, who focuses on 
Nietzsche as a thinker of reality as an ungraspable totality of chaos, which if it be amenable to 
characterization at all, might only be characterized as a dynamic of active and reactive forces, 
and Hatab, who similarly characterizes will to power as a ‘tensional force field’ in which human 
types and personalities (such as the ascetic) either find, or fail to find, their flourishing.160 The 
broader debate concerning the justification for this thematization of the will to power – whether 
it truly deserves a categorization as an ontological motif, and whether Nietzsche really intended 
this, or whether its scope is purely limited to a psychological hypothesis regarding human 
motivation – is not my concern here. I simply wish to give the context behind his statement 
about the impossibility of willing ‘nothing at all.’  
The irony of the ascetic ideal is that while those within its grip can convince themselves 
that they fervently deny life, this proves to be only the lure that keeps them tethered to life. 
Nietzsche obviously has someone like Schopenhauer in mind here – a bold thinker dedicated 
to his project of demonstrating the nihilistic absurdity of life’s ceaseless regeneration, but 
whose dedication to this project is precisely that which “freed him from torture and kept himself 
tortured”.161  
This is an example of Nietzsche’s tendency to bypass the contents of philosophies, and 
instead focus on the analysis of the philosopher as a personality type, as a specimen of human 
flourishing, or its lack thereof. Witness his characterization of Kant as an ‘idiot’, as the 
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‘Chinese spirit of Königsberg’162; similarly, his mature dismissal of Schopenhauer as a ‘case 
of the first order for the psychologist’163 and a particularly crude dismissal of Spinoza’s thought 
as ‘the conceptual web-spinning of a hermit.’164 With Schopenhauer in particular, for all of his 
initial interest in the latter’s thought, by the time of the Genealogy, Nietzsche considers him a 
perfect manifestation of the ascetic ideal – the quintessential ‘European Buddhist’165. The 
ascetic ideal (as until now ‘the only true meaning the animal man has had’) is now considered 
to be a ground upon which the history of Western metaphysics is to be re-evaluated.166  
The ascetic ideal is therefore an aestheticization – insomuch as aestheticization 
functions in Nietzsche’s thinking as a mechanism of fundamental justification – of an 
exhaustion and ‘nausea with life’.167 This aestheticization therefore functions as the trap that 
life sets to keep the exhausted and the nauseous on the trail. 
 
Ressentiment and the ascetic ideal 
The ascetic ideal arrives on the stage of world history as an outgrowth of bad conscience. It 
grows out of the soil of an epoch where mankind is structurally turned against itself, resulting 
in the ‘ascetic planet’ par excellence.168 Bad conscience emerged from a crystallized 
ressentiment, and the ascetic ideal emerges as the fruit of a long period of bad conscience. The 
line of descent from ressentiment to the ascetic ideal is encrusted, but still visible.  
The ressentiment of the slave achieves its victory in the slave revolt in morals. Being 
fundamentally other-directed and lacking in genuine creativity, ressentiment is hostile to life. 
The ascetic ideal harnesses the energy of this reactive ressentiment. The figure that is 
responsible for this corralling of the energies of ressentiment is the ascetic priest, who builds 
the ascetic ideal from the ground up, and is responsible too for its maintenance and honouring. 
The pathway from ressentiment to the self-destructive and nihilistic experiment of the ascetic 
ideal must thus be delineated – once this is accomplished, the line of descent to philosophy 
should become clear. 
The very nature of the phenomenon of ressentiment is the blocking of avenues of 
willing. Here however, I must complicate this picture and draw a distinction between the 
ressentiment discussed in the previous chapter, which was entirely associated with slaves in 
relation to the master, and the ressentiment associated with the priests, which is crucial for the 
origin of the ascetic ideal. A good portion of this discussion will draw on Ian Morrison’s article 
‘Ascetic Slaves: Rereading Nietzsche’s On the Genealogy of Morals’.169  
In the first essay of the Genealogy, Nietzsche holds that the priests and the knightly 
aristocracy form two layers of the masterly class – ‘the highest caste is at the same time the 
clerical caste’ and only later splits off.170 A defining characteristic of the nobility is the pathos 
of distance, a sense of distinction between themselves and their inferiors. Where the split 
between the knightly aristocracy and the priests occurs is in their levels of activity. Nietzsche 
maintains that, from time immemorial, the priest has always been associated with 
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‘fundamentally unhealthy’171 customs which stress brooding, inactivity, and an oversevere 
sense of one’s dignity, due to ‘his habitual forms of expression being circumscribed by his role 
in service of the gods’.172 Within the priesthood, the pathos of distance is internalized. This 
Nietzsche refers to as the internalization of severe value-dichotomies, a development that has 
its origin in the fact that priests have always understood clearly that political rank is easily 
translated into spiritual rank.173 They understood these values to ‘pick out characterological 
traits rather than merely class-related characteristics’.174 Unlike the knightly aristocracy, whose 
day-to-day lives were filled with action and violence, there exists no such outlet for priests, 
with the result that this internalization leads to psychosomatic complaints and a growing 
‘heaviness and fatigue’ of the body.175 
It is here that the ressentiment of priests takes root – for Nietzsche, ressentiment is 
always a response to suffering. The ressentiment of the slaves is a crude and unidimensional 
response to the suffering experienced in relation to the masters. With the priest, ressentiment 
is a more complex matter, with the suffering being experienced internally, due to the priests’’ 
dangerous ‘internalization and sharpening’ of value-distinctions, and the fundamentally 
inactive nature of his lifestyle.176 As Hatab puts it, a life-averse and ultimately counternatural 
collection of drives and wish-fulfilments coalesce under the organizing principle of the ascetic 
ideal and come to dominate the priesthood.177 Corporeality becomes the locus for ressentiment 
and, eventually, so too do the very conditions of life.178 The priest wants a cure for the body 
which itself has become a sickness, a cure for the ‘sins entailed in corporeality’, and thus 
something that desperately needs to be transcended.179 
The ascetic ideal thus emerges from the severe spiritualized ressentiment of the priests 
against their co-nobles, the knightly aristocracy. This attack on masterly values, the slave revolt 
in morals, would not possess half its force without the element of the ascetic ideal. The 
ressentiment of the priest, like all ressentiment, serves to separate the active force from what it 
can do. The genius of the priest lies in his inventiveness with regard to the fictions which must, 
in the course of civilized life, insert themselves between the agent and his activity. The ascetic 
ideal, like all ressentiment, performs a dual purpose. It hinders the active (the master) and it 
soothes the passive (the slave). Thus, the ascetic ideal in its latter function forms itself gradually 
as an amalgamation of the various ascetic ‘cures’ that the priests devised for their self-inflicted 
suffering. It is in an effort to distract themselves from the suffering attendant upon their 
corporeality that priests have at all times advocated certain diets, abstinence, isolation i.e. 
‘fleeing into the dessert’.180 In other words, the priestly aristocracy makes use of the ascetic 
ideal as ‘evaluative justification for the purifying practices’.181 
It is worthwhile here, having made the distinction between the species of ressentiment 
specific respectively to the slave and the priest, to focus on the interrelation between the two. 
The ressentiment of the priests is far more ambitious than that of the slaves. However, the ideal 
of the ascetic priests – of life turned against life – eventually merges with the slaves’ more 
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localized ressentiment, to form the ascetic ideal to such an extent that slave morality and the 
ascetic ideal become intermingled freely and almost synonymous.  
Therefore, in one sense, Nietzsche would agree with the species of ‘freethinkers’ that 
arose during his time period, mostly of a left-wing political tendency, that the influence of 
religious thinking successfully clouded the eyes of the politically disenfranchised. Here I return 
to the structural role of the ascetic priest. In ‘exporting’ this larger, more absolute vision of the 
ascetic ideal, the ressentiment-filled slaves are encouraged to turn their eyes from the local 
instigators of their suffering (the nobles) and are given a grand ideal within which they live out 
their destinies. Thus, the structural role of the ascetic priest is the inward redirection of a 
potentially explosive ressentiment, under the gentle guise of a metaphysics.  
Ressentiment adopts the ascetic ideal as an existential preservative, the better to soothe 
itself in its impotency, and thus the ascetic priest is recruited by the state to prevent ressentiment 
from demolishing the underlying structures thereof. He is the ‘shepherd’ of a flock held by 
ressentiment and sublimated by the guiding ideas of the ascetic priest.182  
 
The ascetic ideal in relation to philosophy 
Having completed this sketch of the ascetic priest, and described his link to 
ressentiment, slave morality and the ascetic ideal, I will now explore the relation between the 
ascetic ideal and the discipline we know by the name of philosophy. Preparatory to this 
discussion, however, I wish to adumbrate Nietzsche’s conception of philosophy. This 
discussion draws heavily from Ansell-Pearson’s recent book, Nietzsche’s Search for 
Philosophy.  
It is a common characterization of Nietzsche that he is the archetypal ‘anti-
Enlightenment irrationalist’183. This is obviously a caricature, and a fundamental 
misunderstanding of the nature of Nietzsche’s critique. What Nietzsche deems to be the 
problem with philosophy is that it has not been true to itself. 
Ansell-Pearson interprets the beginning of Nietzsche’s philosophical career as 
consisting in the insight that philosophy is the long-since congealed detritus of an original 
spiritual impulse manifested by a few individuals in Ancient Greece. This event heralded a new 
approach to man’s relationship with reality. As Ansell-Pearson observes, ‘the pre-Platonic 
philosophers promise and announce new modes of existence but ultimately the supreme 
possibility of the philosophical life is lost.’184 By this broad definition, philosophy is not to be 
considered a matter of a set of questions, or a set of intellectual tools developed to answer these 
questions. Rather, Ansell-Pearson interprets Nietzsche’s understanding of philosophy in its 
broadest formulation as an embodied, exploratory approach to the world, the ‘discovery of the 
possibilities of life’185. The drive to knowledge is only the exploratory drive sublimated, and 
exploration is viewed favourably by Nietzsche (a common analogy for him is the great 
thinker’s spiritual resonance with the great circumnavigators of the world) especially if it is not 
directed towards an already determined destination, and even more so if this destination has 
proved hitherto to be a dead-end.  
It has now become the name of a discipline whose subject matter is tightly delineated. 
But that is not what it initially represented – and Ansell-Pearson notes that, throughout his 
career, this is the sense of philosophy that Nietzsche wished to recapture. This sense includes 
a certain aspirational drive towards the recreation of the human that may take forms utterly 
unrelated to what passes for philosophy today. The philosopher, by this reckoning, is a ‘creative 
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thinker who gives us new images of the world and establishes new modes of life’186. Ansell-
Pearson offers a radical interpretation of Nietzsche’s reconceptualization of philosophy, of 
what it may look like in the future – that it may not even wish an answer to the traditional 
philosophical questions and that ‘there is not the one and only correct way of living, and it is 
not a question of discovering the objectively given essence of nature.’187  
I interpret Ansell-Pearson’s discussion of Nietzsche as broadly summarizable in the 
following manner: for Nietzsche, there is no philosophy, but only philosophies. Furthermore 
these philosophies should amount to a fundamentally exploratory individuality, localized in 
each case. Given this redefinition of the philosophical endeavour, Nietzsche expresses his wish 
that the philosopher of the future should be called ‘attempters’ instead.188 This is why 
Nietzsche, far from condemning philosophy, wonders if something like ‘the philosopher on 
earth to be really possible.’189 I interpret this to mean that Nietzsche considers that philosopher 
has not existed hitherto, so that there remains a possibility that philosophy may yet fulfil its 
initial promise. 
To return to the phenomenon of the ascetic ideal, Nietzsche thinks that philosophy, 
driven as it is by a fundamental curiosity, was once a revolutionary venture and one which still 
carries this revolutionary promise today. So how did philosophy end up in a cul-de-sac? How 
is it that something as inherently life-affirming as philosophy, becomes allied to its utter 
opposite, the ascetic ideal, in such a manner that the two have been taken to be synonymous 
for the entirety of the history of philosophy?  
The answer lies precisely in the nature of philosophy’s inherently revolutionary nature 
– or, to be more precise, the philosopher’s inherently revolutionary nature, constituted as he is 
by ‘his drive to doubt, his drive to deny, prevaricate, analyse, research’.190 Curiosity cannot 
exist without a corrosive doubting and the first philosophers were forced to venture into the 
open terrain of this new doubting, surrounded by the ‘deep mistrust’ and revulsion of the 
community.191 The reason for their occasioning such distrust is because in so casting the seeds 
of doubt wherever they ventured, the first philosophers had to go against millennia-worth of 
crude, but institutional, morality, that of the tribe.192 
Nietzsche considers the figure of the philosopher to herald a great potential, a promise 
towards the seeking out of a new way of life, before the philosopher was seduced and captured 
by the ascetic ideal. Nietzsche thus argues that in order to safeguard this new spirit within them 
the first philosophers were forced to hide themselves under the façade of the ascetic ideal. Why 
this ideal, and not any other?  
A lively debate has sprung up within the literature, which tries to sift through the text 
in order to locate the attraction of the ascetic ideal for the burgeoning philosopher. Nehemas 
argues that the philosopher’s attraction towards asceticism can be interpreted as a simple 
utilitarian calculus, i.e. the giving up of the pleasures of the body, for example, in order to 
preserve the pleasures of the mind.193 Clark, on the other hand, disagrees and argues that this 
interpretation saves too much of the philosopher from Nietzsche’s devastating critique, and 
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that it is more honest to the text to identify the ascetic priest and the philosopher as being one 
and the same.194  
Although Clark’s reading of the text resonates with the polemical nature of Nietzsche’s 
critique, I believe that there is a genuine ambiguity in the text, where Nietzsche sometimes 
insinuates that the philosopher is distinct from the ascetic priest, and other times insists that 
they are one and the same. In addition, Hatab has teased out a subtle distinction between the 
value of a certain asceticism that goes towards the cultivation of the individual (Nietzsche 
would have probably considered himself an example of this) and the moral absolutism of the 
ascetic ideal.195 The reason for this distinction is to show how unnecessary the wholescale 
importation of the ascetic ideal is to the genuine philosopher, an unfortunate ‘faute de mieux’, 
and how, even if it once served as an ill-fitting disguise, it could now be abandoned.196  
The adoption of the ascetic ideal by the first philosophers is to an extent then an accident 
of history. It is pertinent to note here that philosophy – the commitment, however much it falls 
by the wayside, to independent thinking – is a comparatively recent phenomenon. Thus, when 
it first appeared on earth it had to appear using the forms that were available to it. As to why 
the first philosophers adapted themselves to this ideal, the text provides us two broad 
summaries.  
Firstly, the ascetic ideal is the descendent of certain broadly recognizable, already 
established human personality types – the shaman, poet, and medicine-man for example – 
whose value to the community (and thus the safeguarding of their existence) lay in their access 
to arcane and obscure mysteries outside the realm of sensible reality. The first philosophers, in 
cloaking themselves in the ascetic ideal, readily borrowed the solution, long since perfected by 
the priests, to the perennial problem faced by contemplative men (viz. the problem of suspicion 
towards their unwarlike natures) i.e. appear to be a guardian of arcane knowledge and obscure 
forces, from whom retribution is always possible. Migotti teases out the inference that 
Nietzsche leaves unsaid in the text – that this initially crude formulation (demons, or spirits, 
for example) is blown up into an abstraction which posits an ideal world against this world, 
which is forever condemned to be a pale copy.197 The ascetic ideal allowed the first 
philosophers to create fear and reverence amongst their observers, and therefore ward off the 
suspicion that greeted the dawning of a state of a higher intellectuality that came into existence 
with them.198  
Secondly, philosophers even to this day have always maintained a fondness for this 
ideal – because it is perfect for their ‘form of flourishing’, which consists in a condition of 
higher intellectuality.199 Nietzsche holds that every life form strives to attain its optimal 
conditions of flourishing, and the ascetic priest, a personality type that seems predicated 
precisely on the opposite principle, is no different. The ascetic ideal was so intriguing to the 
first philosophers, because it allowed them an avenue to a certain independence200 – from 
marriage, business, riches, which is to say from the whole gamut of human sociability focused 
on the here and now – that allowed them to think at a higher level, and for sustained periods of 
time.  
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The paradox of the ascetic ideal therefore is that it serves as the ‘wet-nurse’ for 
philosophy, it is the first guise under which philosophy first makes its appearance on earth; but 
philosophy was born amidst monstrous injustice – that is why it has hitherto had its gaze 
squinted and its soul poisoned.201 
I wish to insert a brief note here regarding the concept of a higher intellectuality – which 
is everywhere associated with philosophy – and the nuances which accompany it. As we have 
seen, for Nietzsche, drives do not exist in isolation from each other. The body itself is a 
battlefield of competing drives. The intellect too is not neutral, but comes to be the dominating 
instinct of philosophers, precisely because in them for the first time the intellect dominates the 
other drives, particularly those of the body. The first philosophers ‘found their value-judgments 
all turned against themselves’ – in particular, they felt within themselves all the old, suddenly 
crude and primitive instincts of life, the rapaciousness of a body suddenly become alien.202 
Hence, in order to safeguard their new independence, they were forced to mercilessly crush 
these remnants of a previous, more brutal age. The intellect soon became the philosopher’s 
dominant instinct, developed at the cost of bodily health and vitality. 
This development is compounded by the fact that the first philosophers, aware on a 
fundamental level that they were beyond the pale of established ways, divorced themselves 
from as much bodily feeling as possible, in order to gain some semblance of respite from guilt 
and fear – – what in more modern terms might be called the repression of bodily affect.203 This 
compounds the predominance of the intellect. In a roundabout way, pride in intellect consists 
of pride in the suppression of the body.  
 
Conclusion 
I will conclude this chapter by summarising its various interpretive strands. Firstly, the triumph 
of ressentiment entailed a structural change in human society, and in human being itself. 
Memory, understood as the guardian of guilt, was harshly intensified in the human animal. 
With this, ressentiment accomplished its aim of disarming the ever-present threat of chaos, in 
the form of the defeated masterly element. This complex of memory and ever-increasing guilt 
translated into the phenomenon of ‘bad conscience’, whereby the animal ‘man’, with all easily 
available outlets for his aggression and cruelty withdrawn, turns against himself. ‘Bad 
conscience’, far from being an isolated phenomenon, eventually becomes the default mode of 
existence for the vast majority of human beings. 
 I would argue that the first philosophers, themselves thoroughly infused with bad conscience, 
and yearning for avenues to torture themselves still further, seized upon the discipline of 
philosophy – with its massive abstractions, constructions of ideals, and concomitant 
degradation of mutable human reality – to sharpen even more subtly the knives of their self-
torture. 
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CHAPTER 5: Ressentiment and Philosophy  
 
“How I understand the philosopher – as a terrible explosive, endangering 
everything … my concept of the philosopher is worlds removed from any concept 
that would include even a Kant, not to speak of academic ruminants and other 
professors of philosophy”  
-  Ecce Homo, S 3.2.4  
 
In this chapter, I move on from the figure of the philosopher to the practice of philosophy itself. 
My reading will proceed on the basis of two distinct but related planks, which Nietzsche 
discusses frequently but in a scattershot manner throughout his corpus. I will firstly examine 
the thematization of the external world, and secondly the thematic of insistence on truth and 
certainty. In both instances, I focus on the linkages between these and the concept of 
ressentiment.  
 
On the thematization of the external world  
The thematization of the external world as something amenable to a regularized 
investigation of the philosophical and scientific variety is a foundational brick in the edifice of 
traditional philosophy. The assumption that lies beneath such a thematization is the assumption 
that the world is essentially regular, and thus amenable to a regularized investigation. As I have 
endeavoured to make clear throughout this thesis, Nietzsche’s critique of this conception stems 
from his assertion that his philosophical forebearers had completely neglected the flux and 
chaos of physical reality – the world in “its total character” as chaos “in all eternity”204 – with 
the exception of the pre-Socratic thinker Heraclitus, of whom he remained an admirer.205I 
submit that insomuch as ressentiment is a form of reactivity – a reactivity that cannot act out 
its reaction – it implies a perception of the world as similarly nonactive and, driven to 
philosophical speculation, elevates this arrested flux into an imago of eternal stability. To drive 
home this point, I will now revisit the discussion on memory from the last chapter, and pick up 
a strand of interpretation concerning its relationship to the project of man’s self-regularization 
viz. his need to make himself predictable to an extent. 
What does it mean to make a promise? I might say that to make a promise simply means 
that I ‘keep my word’. If I make a promise to give person X an object A, it is incumbent upon 
me to do so. But between the making of the statement and its completion, a momentous 
development has taken place.206 The bridge between statement and completion does not 
comprise merely of a period of time, but also of the person himself who has made the promise. 
It is necessary that the person travels with the promise.  
Therefore man himself must be formed into a creature that is able to promise. He must 
be able to, in other words, make himself committed to a certain picture of the world in which 
he is only as good as his promise. Man must be weaned away from his forgetfulness, and his 
tendency to appropriate the world with a permanent newness and instead must be given a 
memory so that he can become wedded to his new responsibility to others.207  
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There are two possible links between memory-induced predictability and the eventual 
rise of philosophy. Firstly, Nietzsche makes the point that in the process of making themselves 
predictable and regularized creatures worthy of making a promise, a whole host of other mental 
skills developed in the newly socialized animal. The necessity of having to become so 
regularized, even to himself, meant that man needed to have a certain degree of control over 
the future and was forced to regulate himself to the degree that he became answerable for the 
future. With this comes the ability to differentiate cause and effect, to distinguish gradations of 
causality, to calculate and compute.208 This new human (self-)regularity is connected to the 
eventual development of philosophy insomuch as the necessity for regularization meant a 
concomitant regularization of the ‘external world’.  
Of course, given his insistence on the primacy of chaos, Nietzsche insists that no such 
‘regularization’ occurred or is even possible, other than as an aesthetic activity – for ‘chaos is 
opposed to all human categories.’209 What had occurred was merely the removal of a great deal 
of freedom from the world.210 In the wake of this self-imposed alienation, calculation, 
abstraction, and a host of related intellectual sub-faculties arose. These all partook of an 
existential project designed to move the immediate locus of action away from the newly self-
imprisoned individual. 
Nietzsche notes that the creation of memory allowed for a certain pride within man – 
he is, after all, “the creature who is able to promise”.211 Man’s pride at his own self-subjugation 
served as a motivation and the basis for a similar enterprise of subjugation regarding chaotic 
reality. This new desire to tame reality – analogous to the taming of man – is another link 
between memory-induced predictability and the origin of philosophy.  
Another dimension of the rise of philosophy is the development of a certain emotional 
coolness characteristic of the philosopher. Nietzsche remarks again and again regarding the 
primordial psychology of the master, that he is ‘overflowing’ with ‘abundant vitality’212 and 
possesses the ‘strong emotion through which nobles have recognized each other through the 
ages.’213 Elsewhere, there are remarks suggesting that a healthy culture possesses a ‘certainty 
of life and the future, and an overflowing energy’.214  Since the necessity for self-regulation 
turns on the need to make man regular even unto his own self-image, this necessity means 
‘solemnity and a suppression of emotion’ insomuch as emotion (and insofar as emotion is 
bodily, the body as well) is inherently chaotic, and exists as the first barrier to self-regulation.215 
The deceptive apprehension of reality as regular –which makes necessary the bracketing of all 
other possible interpretations –implies a regularity of perception, and thus of emotion. The 
emotional coolness of the archetypal philosopher, his disinterested selflessness, is the ascetic 
value of selflessness in disguise, and finds its origin here.  
I also submit that reason itself as a phenomenon in human life arises as a purely reactive 
phenomenon that takes the place vacated by the hitherto freely moving energies of emotion: 
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“With the aid of memory, people finally came to Reason”.216 Reason – and the development of 
philosophy – emerges when the chaotic elements of primitive man are condemned to be tamed.  
To make one final point regarding the relationship between the inculcation of memory 
and predictability, in the Genealogy, Nietzsche repeatedly defines ressentiment as a reactive 
formation that differs from mere reactivity in that it does not act out its reaction. This ties in to 
what he says later in the text, when he defines the man of ressentiment as someone suffering 
from memory akin to a constantly bleeding wound, a dyspeptic even. The man of ressentiment 
is a man who is never done with anything, who is unable to digest his experiences.217  
This ressentiment festers within the soul of the afflicted party and precludes him from an 
engagement with the world that would be based on a constant newness of experience. This  
newness, in Nietzsche’s reckoning, is precisely the function of a consciousness which 
possesses the plasticity of health and is thus able to transform its reactivity into a relative 
activity.218 In its absence, ressentiment instead forces us to re-live the shadows of a memory 
flooded with stagnant injuries. This accounts for the pseudo-stability of the world that the man 
of ressentiment experiences. The sublimation of this self-image as essentially non-active and 
its subsequent projection on to the ‘external world’ is a fundamental misconception (perhaps 
wilful) with regard to the nature of reality.  
A utilitarian mentality and way of being in the world emerges from a ressentiment-
driven personality – in that, deprived of activity himself, the man of ressentiment demands 
compensation from the activities that his superiors undertake as a matter of course.219 Deleuze 
puts forward the interpretation that this slavish self-pity is sublimated when the civilized man 
of ressentiment nonetheless sets himself up as a ‘light’ upon such activities,220 as a judge that 
apportions reactive blame and vengeance. 
This point ties in with Nietzsche’s remarks on the essentially reactive nature of the 
slave’s being which necessitates the apprehension of a hostile world. Thus, we arrive at the 
traditional vocation of philosophy – the legislating on the ‘state-of-affairs’, and a legislating 
which consists of a spiritual condemnation of the chaos of life, firstly represented primitively 
by the master, and then sublimated to take on an abstract quality by itself.  
Truth and certainty  
The devotion of philosophers before the ideal of truth is a constant target of sarcasm in 
Nietzsche’s corpus. Before I unpack the link between ressentiment and truth, I will introduce 
this section with a few words regarding the ‘prizing’ of consciousness.  
Nietzsche insists on a ’modesty of consciousness’.221 In other words, we should 
apprehend it for what it is: a historically novel and extremely limited organ that cannot 
substitute for the self (which Nietzsche’s identifies with the body – see his discussion in Thus 
Spoke Zarathustra). Again, the discussion in the previous section is relevant here. Deleuze 
insists that consciousness is a reactivity formed against a superior active force, which consists 
not only of the unknowable energy of the world, but also that of the body. Therefore, anything 
which is active, by definition, escapes consciousness because what is active is a plastic, form-
giving faculty.222 Consciousness is thus by his definition not active. There is some basis in 
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Nietzsche’s own writings to support this interpretation, such as in his discussion on 
consciousness in the Gay Science.223  
The prioritizing of consciousness in the philosophical endeavour thus comes down to 
two factors. Firstly, it is a reactive bulwark, an oasis of illusionary calm against the world and 
against the body, both of which are vaguely apprehended as being ambassadors of chaos. 
Secondly – and more directly relevant to my discussion of philosophy in its relation to 
ressentiment – it offers a model of stasis and relative non-activity which can be mapped on to 
the external world.  
Coming to the question of truth, Nietzsche’s preferred strategy is to bypass the 
intricacies contained in debating over the criteria regarding truth. He often simply refuses to 
wade into the thickets of a value-formation that has already taken place, instead choosing to 
investigate said value-formation under the genealogist’s aegis, by embarking on a search for 
origins and development. Nietzsche thus does not ask ‘what is truth’ but asks, ‘who wants the 
truth?’ – and more specifically, what does the human being in thrall to truth tell us about the 
type of human being he is.  
The truth-seeker wants the truth because he wants a truthful world. The desire for a 
truthful world rests on the implicit admission that the world as is actually duplicitous and 
brimming with falsity. When Nietzsche asks, ‘Why truth? Why not untruth instead?’, he is 
really questioning our prioritizing of truth, as if it had any value outside of our concerns. 
Nietzsche can even go so far to say that “the false has priority over the true.”224  
Since the world of truth (which corresponds to the Kantian noumena in its various 
forms, as well as the perennial distinction between reality and appearance more generally – 
“The reasons for which this' world has been characterized as 'apparent' are the very reasons 
which indicate its reality; any other kind of reality is absolutely indemonstrable”225) does not 
actually exist, other than as one interpretation amongst many, Deleuze insists that what the 
seeker after truth truly wants is the destruction of the actually existing world in all its hopelessly 
indeterminable multiplicity.226 I am not willing to go so far, but I will take on board the implicit 
Nietzschean insight that the demand for truth traces its origin to a moral demand. Life takes on 
the quality of an error that needs to be set right, of mere appearance that is interpreted to serve 
as a signpost to a more honest and complete realm.  
Here we can draw out the concrete link between ressentiment and the world of the true. 
The distinction between the true world and the false world as a moral distinction arises in the 
wake of ressentiment. This point is closely allied to the implicit critique of thought and its 
supposed privileged relationship to truth. Deleuze maintains that this is one of the most 
important aspects of Nietzsche’s philosophy; the ‘radical transformation of the image of 
thought’ and it’s escape from ‘the element of truth and falsity’.227 Thought is therefore to be 
reconceptualized as ‘interpretation and evaluation’ of the forces which give rise to itself.228   
Thought is tethered to the ascetic ideal insomuch as it aims to suppress all differences, 
all hints of multiplicity, and insomuch as it aims to construct for itself a monument to the true 
world. It therefore functions as a cry of pain – a ‘night of torture and absurdity’ – for those with 
ears to hear it.229 Thought does not flutter to the truth ‘by right’.230 Thought is tethered to 
reactivity and to the ascetic ideal, and has until now had its energies co-opted by the paradox 
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of life turning against life, and by ressentiment and the ascetic ideal. This is why Nietzsche can 
talk of a new sense of thought, one that will not have its possibilities constrained by a reactive 
circumscription of its role.  
To draw one final link between ressentiment and the desire for truth, I would mention 
a brief tangent midway through the Third Essay of the Genealogy, where Nietzsche embarks 
on, which deals with the argument that the fundamental propositions of metaphysics – viz. 
desensualized abstractions, a perverse doubting of what is most obviously true, absurdities such 
as an ‘eye that looks in no direction at all’,231 the denigration and almost pathological hatred of 
becoming, that which plunges and brings forth ceaselessly – are in reality mere sublimations 
of the physiological exhaustion that is irrevocably linked to asceticism and the ideal thereof. 
The fundamental tenets of metaphysics, far from being profound truths, are a symptom of 
exhaustion and nausea that seeks to hide precisely this. Such philosophizing is not even faithful 
to reason, in spite of its pretensions; rather, what is witnessed in the multi-faceted denigrations 
of physicality and the reality of one’s own ego, as well as absurd conceptual dichotomies such 
as subject/object, is deliberate cruelty inflicted upon reason. The will to contradiction invents 
doubt where there is none, invents also a realm of truth, and demotes reason to being forever 
excluded from it.232 Nietzsche makes the argument that this bears all the traces of descent of 
the ascetic ideal, insomuch this ideal is born in ressentiment, and seeks to denigrate life, as well 
as genuine thinking and reason insomuch as these truly springs from the energies of life.   
With regard to the ascetic ideal, philosophy’s insistence on truth stems from the ascetic 
priest’s role in providing interpretations for the suffering of those consumed with ressentiment. 
‘Reasons bring relief’ as Nietzsche says.233 Additionally, the notion of truth must be analysed 
in its form as the deepest manifestation of the ascetic ideal. Hatab draws a thread from 
Nietzsche’s text which locates the will to truth in the priest’s previously mentioned tendency 
towards severe value-internalizations, which inevitably leads, upon its eventual sublimation 
under the aegis of the coming philosophers, to an unconditional binary model of truth that aims 
for immunity from any other taint of otherness.234 Here I would once again draw attention to 
the priestly aristocracy’s perennial concern for purity. The ascetic ideal and its stark binary 
model of truth, stems from an inability to assimilate the Other – the desire to escape the, to 
borrow Hatab’s terminology once again, tensional force field that is the will to power at play.235  
When faith in the god of the ascetic ideal– faith in the god that justifies one’s suffering 
– fails, only then does the value of truth come into question.236 Why truth? Because reasons 
bring relief: man does not mind suffering; he cannot stand suffering without a reason, hence 




To round off this discussion on Nietzsche’s suspicion of the value of truth and its relation to 
ressentiment, I hope to provide some illustration by means of contrast through a very brief 
discussion on Nietzsche’s thinking about art. The literature on this is extensive, and I cannot 
consider it in full. My only aim in this discussion is to consider Nietzsche’s thinking on art in 
relation to truth and the will to truth.  
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Art features in Nietzsche’s thinking from the beginning of his philosophical career. The 
Birth of Tragedy is in large part devoted to the question of art and its role in human life. 
Nietzsche avers in this text that the role of art is to ensconce us in illusion.238 This is an echo 
of the ancient Greek theme that being manifests as the play of appearances to hide the terrible 
reality within – something that I had discussed in the section on naturalism and chaos. Art plays 
a foundational role in masking the terrible reality of chaos, and the nature of aesthetic 
affirmation consists in the mastering of chaos through art. As Nietzsche puts it, we ‘possess art 
to avoid perishing from the truth’.239 
By the end of his career, the understanding of art as a means of ensconcing us in illusion 
remains with him, but the thinking of art and its role in human life has become deeper than 
simply ‘making things beautiful for us when they are not’.240 The reason for this deepened 
appreciation for art is the intervening engagement with the history of philosophy, which had 
left him with a suspicion of the will to truth. Nietzsche’s philosophy is the reversal of 
Platonism; it is the privileging of becoming over being, and of appearance over any abiding 
reality or truth. Art, in its initial role of justifying the characteristically Greek notion of 
groundless chaos, is now recognized by Nietzsche as the good form of the will to appearance.241 
This is a high compliment coming from Nietzsche, and the reverse of this statement should be 
obvious: metaphysics, the clumsy attempt at the seduction of truth, is the bad form of will to 
appearance.242  
Like all moral demands, the will to truth contains within itself an absolutism that cannot 
be fulfilled. The aim of ressentiment, and its offshoot bad conscience is to make the animal 
man ashamed of his animality. The will to truth means man is exiled forever by his inability to 
raise himself to such a pristine absolutism, and by the inextricability of his being from the 
ambiguity of appearance.243 This adds a further dimension to Nietzsche’s invoking of the power 
of art: it not only serves to console us, but it can also save us in a sense from the will to truth 
that has completed its arc and disenchanted the world and ourselves as well. Nietzsche brings 
up as an example of this bad form of the will to appearance the findings of modern science that 
show clearly how much of our thinking is faulty and based in errors, and how much of ourselves 
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